Danmark

25. november 2007

Bat Ye’ors vigtige bog: Eurabia


herschaaldekopievanbatyeor.jpg

Fra : http://piwords.wordpress.com/2007/11/23/eurabia/

EURABIA

Køb den: http://www.amazon.com/Eurabia-Euro-Arab-Axis-Bat-YeOr/dp/083864077X

“Bat Ye’ors første vigtige begreb til beskrivelse af Europa tilstand i den globale Jihads’s tidsalder.
“Eurabia” beskriver et arabiseret Europa, som er villet og gennem årtier er blevet tilstræbt. Hvad europæerne har gjort for at overgive sig, regelret at underkaste sig, er indtil i dag ikke helt klart. Tidspunktet og det udløsende kendes: Oliekrisen fra 1973…”

[…]

“…i kontrakterne forpligter europæerne sig til at lade arabisk arbejdskraft i større antal rejse ind i landene, at stå inde for deres religion og traditioner og lade dem i passende former udøve deres religion, arabiske kultur, sprog og tankegang, og sammen hermed bringe deres politiske meninger (dominant) ind i det europæisk-akademiske landskab og understøtte araberne politisk. Derudover er der sat en teknologi- og pengeoverførselsaftale i gang. Eneste modydelse fra den arabiske-muslimske verden. Oliesalg til Europa.[.. Siden hen fra november 2000 aftales voksende dele af den arabiske oliehandel i Euro…]”

Fortsæt på linket ovenfor på tysk.

Fra Jerusalem Post – en boganmeldelse af Bat Ye’ors: Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis :

“How is it that ten percent of France is Muslim, 15% of Denmark is Muslim and close to half of the births in the next generation will be Muslim? Imperious mosques and lawless Muslim neighborhoods dot the landscape of major European cities. And Spain willingly and meekly chose to acknowledge its Islamic past, and that pro-Arab opinion is rampant and anti-Israeli sentiment vitriolic.”Mordechai Nisan har villet supplere boganmeldelsen med lidt statistik fra det høje nord. Lidt googling overrasker – han er ikke bare endnu en dårlig journalist, men:
“Dr. Mordechai Nisan teaches Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in the Rothberg International School. He is a Research Consultant for the Jerusalem Institute for Western Defence and a member of the Jerusalem Summit’s Academic Committee…”

Supplement:

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/euroolie.htm
English version

“…US-verdens-reserve-rollen under forandring:
Fra november 2000 begyndte Irak at afregne sit oliesalg i euro og konverterede samtidig Iraks ”Olie for Mad” reservefond i FN med $10 milliarder til euros efter aftale med FN. Mellem 2001 og februar 2003 blev næsten hele Iraks olieeksport betalt i euros; cirka $30 milliarder. I den samme periode steg euro relativt i forhold til dollar med 30%. Saddam Hussein havde allerede tilbudt udvindingskoncessioner (der forblev uden virkning på grund af FN sanktionerne) til Frankrig, Kina, Rusland, Brasilien, Italien og Malaysia. Saddam Hussein havde indtil da udelukkende brugt europæiske banker til det begrænsede sanktionsprogram, “Mad for Olie”. Saddam Hussein tilkendte palæstinenserne 1 milliard euros i 2000. EU tilkendte kort efter palæstinenserne samtidig 90 millioner euros i støtte for at vise sit venskab med den arabiske verden, hvis Israel standsede betalingsstrømmen. Nogle få dage herefter indgik den Europæiske Investeringsbank (EIB) en aftale om at låne Syrien 75 millioner euros efter i otte år med sanktioner at have været udelukket fra at gøre forretninger med dette land. Lidt før, i august 2000, donerede EU 1,7 millioner euro til Yemen til støtte for eritreanere, etiopere, somaliere og repatrierede asylanter fra Yemen efter krigen med Etiopien. Støtte fra EU i euros igen: for ikke længe siden foreslog den italienske statsminister Berlusconi en europæisk version af ”Marshall Planen”, som han karakteriserede som en generøs handling til genopbygning af Europa. Han foreslog at yde palæstinenserne en sådan hjælp til en værdi af 6,2 milliarder euro over fem år. [Disse sidste ting medtages for at karakterisere motiver og situationsopfattelse blandt nogle initiativtagere.] Fra november 2000 til den 19. november 2004 er dollar faldet relativt i forhold til euro med 34,5%, fra den 1.december 2002 til 19. november 2004 med 23,5%. En lavere dollarkurs gavner dobbelt, ved at den mindsker det enorme betalingsbalanceunderskud (ved gunstig påvirkning af handelsubalancen og ubalancen i investeringsstrømmen) og øger samtidig amerikanske eksportørers konkurrenceevne, hvilket fører til større investeringer i disse eksporterende firmaer og en forøget beskæftigelse. I øvrigt tyder meget på at petrodollar-eventyret for længst er overstået på grund af den øgede import i de olieproducerende lande og reduktionen i OPEC’s andel af den samlede olieeksport. Irak har de næststørste kendte oliereserver blandt verdens nationer. 45% af EU’s olieimport kommer fra Mellemøstens oliekilder, 80% af Japans olieimport sker fra Mellemøsten, der har 60% af verdens kendte oliereserver. Skulle et sådant skift, som det benævnes enkelte steder, til petroeuro have virkning, skulle Storbritannien og Norge indføre euro, således at Nordsø “Brent” råolie kunne blive prissat i euro. Kort efter Iraks træk satte Jordan bilaterale arrangementer i gang med Irak. I august 2002 havde Iran konverteret mere end halvdelen af sine valutareserver Forex Reserve Fund til euro, og Kina var også begyndt at konvertere nogle af landets valutareserver fra dollars til euro. Samtidig fordoblede den Russiske Centralbank dens beholdninger af euro til 20% af $48 milliarder. En iransk senior olietalsmand Javad Yarjani bemærkede i en tale til det Spanske Finansministerium at ”det var muligt med den voksende handel mellem Mellemøsten og den Europæiske Union, at det kunne være passende at prisfastsætte i euro. Dette ville kunne skabe flere bånd mellem disse handelsblokke med et voksende handelssamkvem, og samtidig befordre en meget tiltrængt europæisk investering i Mellemøsten.” Det britiske herredømme blev bragt på ret køl via Storbritanniens behov for at importere mad, da det hjemlige landbrug blev fortrængt af industrien. Det amerikanske herredømme vil måske blive bragt på ret køl via USA’s behov for at importere fabrikerede varer, når den hjemlige produktion bliver fortrængt af de finansielle serviceydelser…”

http://www.lilliput-information.com/scen.htm:

”…Internationale aftaler:
Ældre internationale konventioner og aftaler har jeg ikke lagt vægt på, udelukkende fordi mange af dem reelt er uforpligtende og ikke overholdes generelt, og de professionelle politikere omtaler dem af samme grund evig og altid. Derimod synes nye typer af internationalt eller bilateralt forpligtende og mere varigt bindende aftaler/dialoger/projekter at have set dagens lys og blive lagt på solide skinner. De er inspireret af beslutningsprocesserne i FN-organerne og bygger ofte på principper svarende til dem, som Jean Monnet funderede Europa-samlingen på i 1950-erne. Her skal vi selvsagt ikke kende indholdet og den præcise taktiske salami-metode. Det startede med den af Jean Monnet indfødte regel om “ingen mulighed for tilbageførelse til det fra medlemsstaterne overførte lovindhold til EU” benævnt Acquis Communautaire, så kan vi tage Nord-Syd-Dialogen fra slutningen af 1960-erne, dernæst Europæisk-Arabiske Dialog om immigration, kultur og penge i begyndelsen af 1970-erne med langt senere opfølgning af sidstnævnte på bl.a. Middelhavskonferencen i slutningen af 1990-erne, så bl.a. ”Olie for Mad-embargoen”, og så kan vi tage EU’s pengeoverførsler til palæstinenserne bevist for EU-kommissionen i maj 2002, jfr.: http://news.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=400992004 . Dette var et skønsomt udpluk…”

Historien gentages i ny version
Merkantilisme og Ny-merkantilisme: https://danmark.wordpress.com/2007/03/21/fra-internationale-vipper-til-nationale-ligevaegte-til-internationale-vipper-i-dag/

A tiny bit of it in an English version

————-

Nøglen til forståelse af Jihad’s strategi og Ideologi

Culturel meeting or clashes with the great caliphate

Den europæisk-arabiske Dialog kører i ekspress-fart

Dansk-Svensk research på Europæisk-Arabiske Dialog

The US-EU-Arabia-dilemma

 

Sonia

21. marts 2007

Fra internationale vipper til nationale ligevaegte til internationale vipper i dag


Ikke meget har ændret sig i hovedet på mennesket
siden Platon skrev sin hulelignelse for 2350 år siden.

Velstand og dominans med ædelt metal (?)

Nysgerrighed, religion og merkantile interesser var bl.a. drivkræfterne, da den oversøiske ekspansion begyndte i 1500-tallet fra Europa. Under fire gange kong Philip af Spanien var der velmagtsdage for en stund efter fundet/plyndringen af enorme mængder ædelt metal i Syd- og Mellemamerika. I 1500 årene blev omkring 170 ton guld og 8.200 tons sølv afskibet til Spanien. De relativt sjældne metaller havde i tusinder af år været eftertragtet og derfor især anvendt direkte som international værdimåler og pengeenhed.

De årlige afskibninger af guld og sølv nåede 16 millioner pesos pr. år under Philip den IV (1621-1665). Det var utrolige skatte de spanske krigsskibe transporterede over Atlanten. Spaniens misundelige naboer i Europa gjorde alt for at tilegne sig disse værdier under transporten. Søslag fandt sted nærmest uophørligt i det Spanske Hav, omkring Azorerne eller hvor franske, engelske eller hollandske krigsføre mænd kunne trænge sig på de forholdsvis dårligt beskyttede/tungt lastede spanske krigsskibe, der benyttedes til transporten af det eftertragtede metal. Sørøveri havde indtil 1620 i en vis forstand været en anerkendt metier, som endog stater mere eller mindre direkte var involveret i.

De spanske kolonier blev styret med vicekonger og andre kongelig agenter direkte fra et enevældigt spansk monarki. Spanien holdt sit kolonirige i Syd- og Mellemamerika ind i det 19. århundrede, men dets triumf, når bortses fra sprog- og kulturpåvirkningen, forsvandt to århundrede tidligere.

Indstrømningen af fabelagtige mængder af guld og sølv fra Den Nye Verden gav Spanien en kort periode med europæisk magt og pragt, men manglen på andre ressourcer både i Spanien og i kolonierne plus styrkelsen af den nederlandske og den engelske sømagt bidrog til den bratte nedstigning for Spanien.

Med guldet kunne man købe til forbrug og betale lejede soldater til krig med henblik på mere erobring og kolonisering; men det lå lige for, at et ressourcesvagt enevældigt Spanien heller ikke kunne andet end købe til forbrug i udlandet.

Den spanske hertug af Alba brugte øgede skatter til undertrykkelsen i Nederlandene. 1573 blev militærmanden Alba erstattet med diplomaten Luis de Requensens som vicekonge i Brussel (det nuværende Belgien var en del af Nederlandene), men oprøret var allerede i gang. Spanien gik bankerot i 1575, mest p.g.a militærudgifterne i dette forholdsvis fjerntliggende land. Manglende betalinger førte til mytteri fra den spanske hær ved Antwerben; de fleste tropper var udenlandske lejetropper.

Den fransk-engelske-hollandske alliance mod Spanien af 1596 og den Engelsk–Spanske Krig (1585–1604) havde effekt. Det engelske flådeangreb mod Cádiz 1587 var en strålende succes, selvom den delvis byggede på en tilfældighed, idet store dele af den spanske flåde var strandet på den irske vestkyst p. g. a. fejlnavigation efter slaget ved Gravelinies i Den Engelske Kanal uden højdetagen for afdriften p.g.a. Golfstrømmen, da den spanske flåde søgte væk nord om Skotland.

Den Uovervindelige Armada:

http://www.futura-dtp.dk/SLAG/SlagS/SpanskeArmada.htm

beretter:

“Engelsk-spanske Krige, 1588 Engelsk hjælp til de nederlandske provinser i deres opstand mod Spanien fik den spanske konge, Philip II, til at forberede en enorm invasionsflåde. Kaldt den Uovervindelige Armada, skulle flåden sikre kontrollen med Den engelske Kanal og derefter transportere en spansk hær under hertugen af Parma (Alessandro Farnese) fra Nederlandene til England. Forsinket i et år af Sir Francis Drakes dristige angreb på Cadiz i 1587, sejlede armadaen endeligt i maj 1588. Den bestod af 130 skibe (inkl. 20 galleoner, 44 bevæbnede handelsskibe og 8 middelhavsgalejer), som medførte i alt 2.500 kanoner og 30.000 mand, hvoraf to tredjedele var soldater. Under kommando af hertugen af Medina-Sidonia (Alonso de Guzmán), led armadaen primært under manglen på erfaren ledelse til søs og fra en svaghed med hensyn til langtrækkende kanoner.

Imens havde Elizabeth I organiseret en landhær for at afvise invasionen og havde beordret den engelske flåde under kommando af Lord Charles Howard af Effinghamtil søs, assisteret af Drake, Sir John Hawkins og Martin Frobisher. Kernen af flåden bestod af 34 skibe som medførte 6.000 mand. yderligere 163 privat ejede fartøjer satte også til søs, men halvdelen af disse var for små eller for svagt bevæbnede til at have nogen betydning.

Forsinket af storme nærmede armadaen sig ikke den sydlige kyst af England før den 19. juli. Den engelske flåde, som manøvrerede til vindsiden (vest) af fjenden, begyndte at bombardere de spanske skibe formeret i en 11 km lang halvmåne, idet de drog fordel af den engelske overlegenhed i langtrækkende kanoner. Ud for Portland Bill den 23. juli, Isle of Wight den 25. juli og ind i Kanalen bestrøg de engelske kanoner de spanske skibe og forårsagede alvorlige tab blandt besætningerne, mod kun små tab for dem selv. Den 28. juli lagde den spanske kommandør ind ved Calais. Den næste nat sendte englænderne otte fartøjer bevæbnede med sprængstoffer som ildskibe ind i den tæt pakkede havn. Disse torpedoer fra det 16. århundrede krævede, sammen med kollisionerne på grund af kaotiske manøvrering for at undgå angrebet, en høj pris blandt armadaen. Medina-Sidonia satte hastigt til søs igen. Ved Gravelines, 24 km sydvest for Dunkirk, mislykkedes hans møde med Parmas tropper, i høj grad på grund af den blokade som den lille nederlandkse flåde opretholdt. Uden noget alternativ vendte spanierne om og kæmpede mod deres plageånder i otte timer den 29. juli.

Tre af armadaens skibe blev sænket og yderligere fire eller fem drevet op på bankerne. Begge sider havde på det tidspunkt opbrugt deres ammunition. Med en ændring i vindretningen afbrød spanierne slaget og sejlede nordpå ind i Nordsøen og rundt om det nordlige Skotland. Mishandlet af storme nåede lidt mere end halvdelen af den oprindelige styrke de iberianske havne i september og oktober.

Alt i alt havde briterne påført langt mindre tab på armadaen end storme og manglen på mad og vand. Men den moralske virkning af det heroiske forsvar mod det mægtigste rige siden romertiden hævede England til en førsteklasses sømagt. Kampen markerede også en afgørende ændring i flådetaktik: den forøgede effektivitet af langtrækkende kanonild gjorde klart den gamle, nærgående bordingsstil af krigsførelse til søs forældet. Således rangerer bekæmpelsen af den Spanske Armada som et af de afgørende slag i historien.”

To nye spanske forsøg på at bringe angreb til udførelse via Irland blev slået tilbage af uvejr i 1596 og 1597.

I 1595 blev den Spanske Krone tvunget til at erklære sig bankerot for tredje gang inden for mindre end fyrre år.

Armadaens fald forhindrede Spanien i at invadere England og afskar Kong Philips bestræbelser på at fastholde kontrollen med Nederlandene, der var blevet handelscentret i Europa. Spaniens krig med Frankrig nogle få år efter gjorde ondt værre. Der var en klar ulyst til at fortsætte Philip II’s aggressive politik. Der var indgået fred med Frankrig i 1598. De sidste år af sit liv levede den ellers magtfulde og ambitiøse Philip II som en ydmyg og desillusioneret hersker, der havde indset at dominans i Vesteuropa og undertrykkelse af det han betragtede som kætteri udenlands ikke mere var hans opgave. Hans sidste store opgave var at slutte fred med Frankrig, før han døde i 1598 i en alder af 71.

Herefter fulgte fred med England 1604, og efter en fjerde statsbankerot i 1607 en våbenhvile med Nederlandene i 1609. Kampen for at underlægge sig Nederlandene havde vist sig at være et håbløst dræn af mænd og penge.

Men ædelmetal-afskibningen fra Den Nye Verden blev ved at øges, og det samme gjorde Spaniens militærmagt, både til lands og til vands i de efterfølgende år. Spanien lange dominans på havene blev kun brudt af hollænderne ved Slaget ved Downs (1639). Af de syv nordiske provinser var Holland ved at blive økonomisk og teknologisk den mest dynamiske del af Vesteuropa. Holland repræsenterede en voksende kontrast til Spanien, der havde udviklet sig til et nærmest lukket samfund i løbet af 1600-tallet og under trykket af krige, skatter og dets egne social værdier var det ikke længere i stand til at ekspandere økonomisk. Holland blev det frieste og mest åbne land i Europa, og i de næste to generationer det mest socialt og økonomisk kreative.

Også under Philip III forblev den spanske flåde den stærkeste i den vestlige verden, men kilderne, der skulle bruges og forbruges, udtørrede uden hjemlige nyinvesteringer: Alt flådeudstyr var udslidt og meget til erstatning skulle importeres fra nord. De spanske lønninger steg hurtigere end det generelle prisniveau i begyndelsen af 1700-tallet, men omkostninger ved flådekonstruktion, udstyr til samme og vedligeholdelse heraf steg i Spanien til det dobbelte eller tredobbelte af niveauet i Holland, England og Frankrig. I perioden 1570-1620 var Vesteuropas glansperiode m.h.t. piratvirksomhed, og den spanske flåde var det almindelige mål. Da konflikten igen begyndte med Holland efter den 10-årige våbenstilstand tilførte Holland den spanske flåde nederlag, og gjorde det dermed uigenkaldeligt klart, at den hollandske afhængighed af Spanien var ovre.

Enevældigt Frankrig sikrer sin stilling – Spanien sin nedgang

Arvekongen Louis XIV med den selvvalgte titel af ”solkonge” havde Cardinal Mazarin som den styrende skikkelse efter forbilledet. Cardinal Richelieu, der døde i 1642, havde sikret fransk sejr i forhold til Østrig og til de tyske lande i Kejserkrigen. Louis XIII døde året efter Richelieu. Den Westfalske Fred blev nu bragt i hus med Hapsburgerne efter 30-årskrigen eller rettede Kejserkrigen. Louis XIV var mindreårig, og Richelieus selvvalgte efterfølger – den italiensk fødte – Cardinal Mazarin fik efter sporadisk at have passiviseret den franske adels modstand mod en fortsættelse af Richelieus politik freden udadtil på plads i 1648. Parlementet i Paris særligt repræsenteret ved de lavere klasser og borgerskabet nægtede i lange perioder at godkende skattelovene. Der var jævnligt opstande i Paris. Det lykkedes Mazarin at klare balancegangen og sikre den enevældige kongemagt med loyale tropper. Den Westfalske Fred løste den østrigske del af det Hapsburgske problem, men den spanske del heraf (lande kunne arves af andre landes konger og dronninger via giftermål og arvefølge). Den spanske Krone var fortsat opsat på at vende nederlag til sejr under de Hapsburgske Phillipper II-IV. Ligeledes lykkedes Mazarin med Freden over Pyrenæerne i 1659 med en bekræftelse af Alsace’s franske tilhørsforhold, et Rhin land, der havde en privilegeret politisk status i forhold til det Hellige Romerske Rige. Dertil en mindre stribe sprogindflydelse i noget af de tidligere spanske Nederlandene (i dag en del af Belgien) plus tab af alle spanske territorier på den nordlige side af Pyrenæerne til Frankrig. Spanien havde især forsøgt under opstandene i Paris med pengestærke mænd sendt ind for øve indflydelse og sammen med rebellerne at bringe Frankrig til fald. Da det ikke lykkedes, og da opstandene var effektivt slået ned, kunne Mazarin vende hele sin opmærksomhed direkte mod Spanien. Om udfaldet var der ingen tvivl, eftersom Englands Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell og den britiske flåde ydede en effektiv støtte. Cardinal Mazarin dør 1661. Han efterlod en stærkt centraliseret fransk Krone med en synlig prestige udadtil. Den franske indflydelse var sikret i Europa i det 17. århundrede. Det eneste der manglede var, at Louis XIV skulle sole sig i sin glorie og forberede vejen for kollapsen.

Merkantilismen sættes i system mod deroute

Den vigtigste af Louis XIV’s ministre var fra 1665 Controller-General of Finances (finansminister) Jean Baptiste Colbert, der var havde været personalechef under Cardinal Mazarin, hvis finansielle rådgiver han blev.

Colbert tolkede en nations velstand efter mængden af tilstedeværende likviditet.

I denne forblindelse udtænkte han en slags økonomisk nationalisme, der blev kendt under betegnelsen ”Merkantilisme” eller ”Colbertisme”. Mod dette mål mente han at kunne føre landet, der i den grad manglede det ædle metal, ved at kompensere herfor ved at stimulere handelsbalancen i national favør og ved at igangsætte kontrol med de potentielle ressourcer af ædelt metal og med opdyrkning af markeder forskellige steder på jorden.

Det han forstod ved en favorable handelsbalance var, at eksporten skulle overstige importen, således at forskellen kom hjem i guld og sølv. Hans simple procedure var at favorisere de begyndende franske industrier, ellers fremstillingsvirksomheder og handelen med deres produkter, og samtidig søgte han at modvirke importen fra udlandet via toldtariffer for at trække Frankrig væk fra bankerottens rand. Uddannede kunstnere fra udlandet blev inviteret og antal industrier blev statsligt understøttede, f.eks. gobelinfremstillingen (grundlægger af de kongelige gobelinarbejder i Beauvais), silke- og glasprodukter og pottemagerindustrier.

På disse felter opnåede Frankrig faktisk en overlegenhed. Han fjernede adskillige interne told- og afgiftsbarrierer på trods af protester fra dem, der nød gavn heraf, for at fremme handelen. Colbert gik også i gang med kanal- og vejbyggerier, han var således initiativtager til Languedoc Kanalen, der forbinder Atlanterhavet med Middelhavet.

Colbert var lige så engageret i at opbygge et kolonialt herredømme for Frankrig og i at organisere den koloniale handel på en måde, så den blev i stand til at konkurrere med den engelske og den hollandske.

Colberts markedsreformer omfattede import af venetiansk glas og flamsk klæde og manufakturer. Han var yderst aktiv med sit told- og tarifsystem. Han sikrede at Fransk Østindisk Kompagni kunne skaffe sig kaffe, bomuld, farvestoffer, pelse, peber og sukker. I tillæg grundlagde han den franske handelsmarine.

Uheldigvis for Colbert og måske også for Frankrig gav hans økonomiske program ikke i de forventede resultater. Det får vi allehånde forklaringer på:

  1. Andre nationer fulgte ikke det samme program
  2. Manglende opbakning til systemet fra kongens side
  3. Frankrig blev dog fortsat i stigende grad forarmet p.g.a. af kongens overdrevne pengeforbrug på krige. Således kan vi læse i enhver mainstream-historiebog.

Udgangspunktet for Colbert var ønsket om national finansiel stabilitet ved at øge likviditeten.

Nye fintmaskede skatteopkrævningssystemer og et nyt nationalregnskab blev indført. Sideløbende hermed førtes helt unødvendige og dyre krige. Bag disse lå delvis ønsket fra kongens side om at få afgrænset Frankrig af Rhinen, Alperne og Pyrenæerne delvis den gamle arvefølgestrid mellem Bourbonerne og Hapsburgerne.

Augsburg Liga-krigen (1688-1698) efter England, Spanien, Sverige, Holland og et antal mindre tyske stater fandt sammen for at begrænse Solkongens ambitiøse udfald mod nord og øst. Straks efter en ellers udmattende lang krig og freden i Ryswick var underskrevet, faldt Louis’ blik på Spanien igen. Philip den IV’s død i Spanien 1665 havde sendt Philips eneste søn, den fysiske og mentalt svage Charles II på tronen, der døde barnløs, november 1700. Herefter ville både det østrigske Hapsburgerhus og de franske Bourboner til magten i Spanien. Det endte med Louis’ andet barnebarn Philip af Anjou, blev Philip V af Spanien. Hele Europa blev forfærdet over dette udfald, og selvom udmattelsen efter den afsluttede krig ikke havde fortaget sig, fulgte Krigen om den Spanske Arvefølge (1701-1713). Fredsafslutningen i Utrecht 1713 og 1714, hvor en mindre omtegning af Europa-kortet fandt sted samtidig med en løfte om af den spanske og den franske krone aldrig skulle kunne forenes. Philip forblev konge mod at en række spanske besiddelser afleveredes til Østrig, Neapel, Milano, Sardinien, og Nederlandene blev i et århundrede fremover benævnt Østrigske Nederlandene. England fik Gibraltar og vigtige import privilegier for handelen på Latin-Amerika.

Frankrig hverken vandt eller tabte på kontinentet. Efter næsten et halv århundredes kamp om kontrollen med Europa, havde Louis XIV gjort overraskende lille fremskridt.

Jean Baptiste Colbert havde været Frankrigs finans-, marine- og handelsminister fra 1661. Han døde 1683 efter have skabt grundlaget for Louis XIV store politiske og militære magtudfoldelse.

England havde en gæld på 10 mill. Pund i 1711, Frankrig var bankerot ved Louis XIV’s død i 1715.

Velstand og dominans når metal skifter til papir

Næste skud på stammer var John Law. En skotsk finansmand (1671-1729), der som ung måtte flygte fra England på grund af en duel affære. Han lærte i Holland og Italien om bankvæsenet og spil. Efter være vendt tilbage til Skotland bragte han forskellige forslag i sine skrifter om en nyordning af pengevæsenet. Han opererede med bl.a. Davanzatis sondring mellem ’bytteværdi’ og ’brugsværdi’ – en tilsvarende sondring genbruges af Karl Marx i 1800 årene – men blev bemærkelsesværdig på grund af flere andre temmelig spøjse økonomiske teorierne. Den eksisterende pengemængde bestemmes ikke af importen af guld og betalingsbalanceoverskud (som merkantilisterne hævdede), men nærmere af kreditudbudet i økonomien, hævdede John Law – hvor vi hævder at kreditten også kan strammes. I 1705 publiserede Law en monetær teori som argumenterede imod brugen af metalpenge og favoriserede papirpenge i den sande Keynesianer-stil. Law hævdede at brugen af papirpenge ville stimulere handelen, og det er jo ikke helt løgn.

Det lykkedes ham først i Paris sammen med velhavende venner – bl.a. Hertugen af Orleans, der stod Louis XV nær – at føre sine stort anlagte finansplaner ud i livet efter Frankrigs bankerot. Law lagde straks en strategi til at stabiliserede Frankrigs økonomi. I maj 1716 fik han koncession på en diskonto- og kreditbank, som fik navnet Banque Générale, designet efter den dengang succesfulde Wisselbank i Amsterdam. Den udstedte sedler, som snart blev modtaget i de offentlige kasser, og modtog guld og sølvindskud. Banksedlerne var indløselige mod ædelmetalmønt ved sedlernes udstedelse. 1718 blev foretagenet statsbank, og snart efter planlagde Law en kæmpekonvertering af Frankrigs statsgæld. Året efter grundlagde han det såkaldte Mississippikompagni med aktiekapital på 100 mill. Fr. Law udnævntes 1720 til generalkontrollør for finanserne. Under dette udstedtes så mange pengesedler og aktiebreve, at den økonomiske krise måtte komme. Kompagniet skulle udbytte Frankrigs besiddelser i Amerika. Siden blev kampagniet slået sammen med andre handelsselskaber, hvorved området udvidedes til Asien. Gentagne gange øgedes aktiekapitalen, og der opstod en sand aktiemani, så at kurserne gik op i mere end 30 gange pålydende. Men 1720 brast boblen med store tab for både staten og private. Law flygtede og døde i Venedig.

England kører parallelt ganske lignende papirprojekt [foruden så meget andet]

South Sea Compagniet i England lignede meget. Tyve års krige med et ophold på tre år uden krig. Med en statsgæld på 10 millioner Pund foreslog England den afviklet ved 6 pct. gennem dette selskab. Selskabet fik derudover nogle handelsrettigheder. Selskabet planlagde sig en monopolstilling på slavehandelsmarkedet. Desuden forventede det, at mexicanerne og sydamerikanerne ivrigt ville bytte deres guld og juveler for uld- og skindklæder fra England. Selskabet udstedte aktier for at kunne lave finansoperationer og skaffe flere investorer. Aktiesalget gik strygende i begyndelsen, og hurtigt blev der udbudt flere papirer, og sådan fortsatte det, tilsyneladende ind i stratosfæren. Udspekuleret marketing og spekulation gik hånd i hånd.

Meget som Enron i USA op til december 2001 eller som Landmandsbankkrakket op til 1923 i Danmark:udbredt korruption mellem direktørerne, selskabets officielle tegnere og deres politiske venner, overvurderede aktiver og undervurdere passiver. Selskabet hævdede at have fingre i flydende palæer og udvinding af solskin fra grønsager. Sir Issac Newton, der havde forudset et kommende kollaps, solgte sine aktier tidligt med en fortjeneste på 7000 pund. Efterfølgende så han, at boblen blæstes endnu mere op med varm luft, og han begyndte at købe igen.

Dels krigen igen mellem Spanien og England 1718, der lukkede for de spanske kolonihavne i Amerika dels det faktum, at selskabet mere opererede i værdipapir-håndtering end i reel profitgivende handel med varer begyndte ledelsen at sælge sine aktie i al hemmelighed. Det kom ud, og så begyndte den store kollaps i de overvurderede papirer, der nu rev alt andet værdipapir med sig ned.

England holdt kun stand, fordi City, London nu havde status som verdens finansielle centrum. Der blev vedtaget en lov, der forbød nyudstedelse af aktier, en lov, der faktisk var gældende indtil 1825 – bemærk, cirka 100 år hvorefter alt forventes glemt (1929: Det Store Wall Street Krak). Finansernes historie berøres altid kun perifert i den traditionelle historieskrivning. South Sea boblen betød faktisk, at Bank of England overtog den økonomiske styring af den engelske nation. En medvirkende årsag var også finansieringen England krigsudgifter i perioden 1800-1815, der satte en stopper for Napoleon. 638 mill Pund var de engelske krigsudgifter i denne krig.

Merkantilismen imødegås, tilbage til guldet og papiret

Allerede den skotske filosof David Hume (1711-1776) berigede os med bidrag (”Om Penge” 1752 og ”Balance i Handelen”), der rettede sig mod de herskende tanker, dengang som nu byggende på merkantilistiske politikker (udtryk opfundet af den senere Adam Smith). Merkantilisterne fokuserede for et land på at få fat i så meget guld, sølv og soldater som vel muligt. En primitiv og kunstig tankegang inspireret af guld- og sølvfundene, som især Spanske opdagelsesrejsende (i 1500-tallet) gjorde i deres grådighed for i sidste ende at kunne veksle disse ædelmetaller for efterspurgte varer. Tankegangen dækker over en forestilling blandt folk, der ikke systematisk har gennemtænkt økonomiske spørgsmål, at forveksle penge med velstand, og jeg kan supplerende foregribe konklusionernes gang: At forveksle penge med guld.

Udenrigshandel blev betragtet som en ensidig interesse, kan man sige. Kun én af handelspartnerne ville nyde gavn af handelen – de komparative fordele som kan forklares for et barn – var ikke nået tankegangen hos de 1700-tals-handlende. Tværtimod: ”Eksporter ikke dine gode naturlige eller producerede hjemlige varer, men prøv få fat i alt det du kan fra fremmede lande”. Hvis det lykkedes for dig med den taktik, bliver du den rigeste. Vinderne var i korthed dem, som kunne samle de største mængder af værdifuldt metal eller værdifulde mineraler og tjene mest ved at beskytte deres egne varer og altså samtidig række ud efter fremmedes landes varer og endog opbygge en stærk hær for at få fat i, hvad der var behov for, ønsket eller begæret.

Merkantilismen i sin helhed var god latin indtil omkring 1800 årene, selvom den væsentligste kritik herimod blev fremsat i 1700 årene af David Hume og Adam Smidt, som vi har set. Efter Napoleonskrigene (1815) skulle England tage initiativerne. Det er uddybet i http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/gul1/gul1.html Selskabet med begrænset ansvar og aktieudstedelse/pengeudstedelse og den fortsatte efterforskning af guldmøntfodens velstandsresultater: http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/gul2/gul2.html

Guldet og anvisninger på guld vedblev i 1800 årene at danne rammen om den internationale samhandel med David Ricardo under den begyndende industrialisering med den internationale verdenshandels England som primus motor.

Så kom det 20. århundredes to verdenskrige som afslutningen på guldets æra og Londons betydning som finansielt centrum efter Første Verdenskrig. Så papirhandel igen under Keynes-æraen, der ikke skulle ophøre før et nyt internationalt betalingssystem byggende på teorivrøvl, dollar og guld var kollapset i 1972.

I tre-fire tiår i efterkrigstiden efter Anden (halvdel af) Verdenskrig(en) arbejdedes med ligevægte i de nationale økonomiske teorier. De officielt tilstræbte ligevægtene var tilsvarende det sidste vi så til teoriernes brug i det offentlige rum.

aktualiseres mod slutningen af det 20. århundrede

Vesteuropa var hurtigt kommet på fode igen efter WW2, og væksten førte til store europæiske eksportoverskud, der samtidig skabte en ophobning af dollars i eksportlandene. Allerede i 1960-erne begyndte Frankrig at indløse dollars i guld og andre fulgte med. Samtidig havde USA et engagement i Vietnam Krigen og andre steder, der bragte underskuddene på de amerikanske offentlige finanser på den tids uinflaterede himmelflugt. I 1967 nåede dræningen af guldreserverne i USA og i Bank of England til et kritisk punkt. At Frankrig og andre europæiske lande helt i overensstemmelse med det aftalte øgede konverteringen af dollars til guld bragte vedvarende dollaren under pres, givet at guldprisen målt i dollars fortsat var uændret, som aftalt i Bretton Woods, da de nye internationale betalingssystem til brug efter krigen blev til under WW1. Det forventedes at USA ville devaluere dollarens pris i forhold til guldet med det stadigt større og større pres fra efterspørgslen efter guld for dollars og fra USA’s handelsbalanceunderskud, ikke mindst de fortsat ufinansierede krigsunderskud på det hjemlige amerikanske budget. Samtidig ”indfarvede” de fleste europæiske lande efterhånden deres egen pengemiddeludstedelse i dollargrønt og begyndte den inflationære vækst, der gik over i stagnerende produktion og beskæftigelse og stadigt højere inflation for til sidst at ende på en rentefod for kortfristet gæld på 21%; dette var kendetegnene for Skandinavien i 1970-ere, hvor velstand omdannedes til lånt såkaldt velfærd.

Med alle vestlige lande statsgældsatte efter en velfærdsgeneration, der gjorde en dyd af at bekæmpe det frembringende og fører dens egne initiativtagere til tops, var det blevet tiden at sprede investeringerne og lade konkurrencen virke internationalt, i områder, der endnu ikke havde glemt ordet velstand.

Petrodollars var blevet grundpillen under mange udsigtsløse lånearrangementer og derfor også drivmidlet for mange af tredjeverdenslandes senere gældskriser i 1980-erne, og i 1990-erne også blandt mere udviklede stater i Latinamerika, Asien og Europa. Hvem skabte risikoen, hvem overdrog risikoen, og hvem måtte i sidste ende tage ansvaret? Allerede i februar 1945 havde USA med den saudiske konge aftalt militær beskyttelse af Saudi Arabien mod at give USA fortrinsret til landets oliekilder. Selvom olieforekomsterne blev nationaliseret i 1976 bevarede ARAMCO (sammenslutning af arabiske og amerikanske selskaber) styringen af produktionen og markederne for olie uden for Saudi Arabien. Overskydende petrodollars holdtes i amerikanske statsobligationer. Et sådant marked er selvsagt et magtpotentiale i hænderne på verdens førende militærmagt. Et eksempel: I 1980 konfiskeredes Irans og Libyens formueposter i USA, og for nylig har organisationer, der angiveligt støtter international terrorisme, lidt den samme skæbne.Sovjetunionens sammenbrud i 1989 og ny fremvoksende union i Europa gjorde det muligt nu at vende tilbage til vipperne.

US-verdens-reserve-rollen under forandring:

Fra november 2000 begyndte Irak at afregne sit oliesalg i euro og konverterede samtidig Iraks ”Olie for Mad” reservefond i FN med $10 milliarder til euros efter aftale med FN. Mellem 2001 og februar 2003 blev næsten hele Iraks olieeksport betalt i euros; cirka $30 milliarder. I den samme periode steg euro relativt i forhold til dollar med 30%. Saddam Hussein havde allerede tilbudt udvindingskoncessioner (der forblev uden virkning på grund af FN sanktionerne) til Frankrig, Kina, Rusland, Brasilien, Italien og Malaysia. Saddam Hussein havde indtil da udelukkende brugt europæiske banker til det begrænsede sanktionsprogram, “Mad for Olie”. Saddam Hussein tilkendte palæstinenserne 1 milliard euros i 2000. EU tilkendte kort efter palæstinenserne samtidig 90 millioner euros i støtte for at vise sit venskab med den arabiske verden, hvis Israel standsede betalingsstrømmen. Nogle få dage herefter indgik den Europæiske Investeringsbank (EIB) en aftale om at låne Syrien 75 millioner euros efter i otte år med sanktioner at have været udelukket fra at gøre forretninger med dette land. Lidt før, i august 2000, donerede EU 1,7 millioner euro til Yemen til støtte for eritreanere, etiopere, somaliere og repatrierede asylanter fra Yemen efter krigen med Etiopien. Støtte fra EU i euros igen: for ikke længe siden foreslog den italienske statsminister Berlusconi en europæisk version af ”Marshall Planen”, som han karakteriserede som en generøs handling til genopbygning af Europa. Han foreslog at yde palæstinenserne en sådan hjælp til en værdi af 6,2 milliarder euro over fem år. [Disse sidste ting medtages for at karakterisere motiver og situationsopfattelse blandt nogle initiativtagere.] Fra november 2000 til den 19. november 2004 er dollar faldet relativt i forhold til euro med 34,5%, fra den 1.december 2002 til 19. november 2004 med 23,5%. En lavere dollarkurs gavner dobbelt, ved at den mindsker det enorme betalingsbalanceunderskud (ved gunstig påvirkning af handelsubalancen og ubalancen i investeringsstrømmen) og øger samtidig amerikanske eksportørers konkurrenceevne, hvilket fører til større investeringer i disse eksporterende firmaer og en forøget beskæftigelse. I øvrigt tyder meget på at petrodollar-eventyret for længst er overstået på grund af den øgede import i de olieproducerende lande og reduktionen i OPEC’s andel af den samlede olieeksport. Irak har de næststørste kendte oliereserver blandt verdens nationer. 45% af EU’s olieimport kommer fra Mellemøstens oliekilder, 80% af Japans olieimport sker fra Mellemøsten, der har 60% af verdens kendte oliereserver. Skulle et sådant skift, som det benævnes enkelte steder, til petroeuro have virkning, skulle Storbritannien og Norge indføre euro, således at Nordsø “Brent” råolie kunne blive prissat i euro. Kort efter Iraks træk satte Jordan bilaterale arrangementer i gang med Irak. I august 2002 havde Iran konverteret mere end halvdelen af sine valutareserver Forex Reserve Fund til euro, og Kina var også begyndt at konvertere nogle af landets valutareserver fra dollars til euro. Samtidig fordoblede den Russiske Centralbank dens beholdninger af euro til 20% af $48 milliarder. En iransk senior olietalsmand Javad Yarjani bemærkede i en tale til det Spanske Finansministerium at ”det var muligt med den voksende handel mellem Mellemøsten og den Europæiske Union, at det kunne være passende at prisfastsætte i euro. Dette ville kunne skabe flere bånd mellem disse handelsblokke med et voksende handelssamkvem, og samtidig befordre en meget tiltrængt europæisk investering i Mellemøsten.” Det britiske herredømme blev bragt på ret køl via Storbritanniens behov for at importere mad, da det hjemlige landbrug blev fortrængt af industrien. Det amerikanske herredømme vil måske blive bragt på ret køl via USA’s behov for at importere fabrikerede varer, når den hjemlige produktion bliver fortrængt af de finansielle serviceydelser.

Unionen egner sig som den ser ud kun til underkastelse – Islam

Euro-Union er ikke et middel imod globaliseringens udløste beskæftigelseskrise. Der er intet specielt ved denne globalisering; det er blot et fyndord; international konkurrence er det rette ord. Euro-union forstærker kapitalens magt og statens magtesløshed i rollen at skulle kunne gøre noget ved arbejdsløsheden uden at have de fornødne redskaber. Det er “fremskridt” mod det 19. århundrede (her søgte man også det rigtige styringsredskab), ikke mod det 21. århundrede. Euro-Union er heller ingen modvægt mod de usociale tendenser i globaliseringen, som inkompetente analytikere fra venstre side mener; den forstærker dem yderligere. Den tvinger nemlig til tilpasning af arbejdslivet til de pengeøkonomiske kommandoer. Den Europæiske Centralbank (ECB) må føre fuldstændig fællespolitik for først 12 senere 15 og 16 forskelligt strukturerede lande i eurozonen, uden at de kan gribe tilbage til vekselkursernes udligningsventil. For at hindre kapitalen i at forlade eurozonen, må centralbanken hæve renten; men dette mindsker aktiviteten og øger arbejdsløsheden yderligere. En sådan union kan kun ende i staternes indbyrdes konflikt, hvorfra der ingen hjælp er at finde – med mindre den bliver udbygget til en transferunion eller en forbundsstat med offentlig finansudligning mellem gamle og nye deltagerlande, noget i retning af kludetæppet USA eller Den tyske Forbundsrepublik, men uden D-marken. Når overførslen af disse forbilleder på Euro-Union viser sig umulige eller møder megen modstand rejser spørgsmålet sig: Er der mulige alternative modeller, der kan redde verdensfreden? Som det kører nu: Europa og den arabiske verden er allerede begyndt at arbejde sammen økonomisk, som det blev forudskikket i Nord-Syd-Dialogen fra 1968 og i den Europæisk-Arabiske dialog fra midten af 1970-erne. Egypten, Jordan, Marokko og Tunis besluttede sig sidste år for at sætte frihandelszone op, og Algier, Libanon, Mauretanien, den palæstinensiske myndighed og Syrien inviteres til at være med i den store frihandelszone. Egypten forventes fuldt optaget i frihandelsgruppen. Imidlertid har EU forhandlet med 12 Middelhavslande som led i den såkaldte Barcelona-Proces om kooperation mellem EU og dets naboer omkring Middelhavet mod syd. Endemålet med denne Barcelona-Proces er at etablere tættere bånd vedrørende handel og sociale spørgsmål så vel som politiske. Dette skal føre til skabelsen af Euro-Middelhavs-Frihandels-Zonen bestående af 27 lande i 2010.Det er muligt at Europa-produktionerne fremover skal foregå i Nordafrika, Mellemøsten og Østeuropa, indtil de er kommet op, og vi kommet helt ned. Det er et spørgsmål om befolkningerne her finder sig i det.

To udbydere af internationale betalingsmidler

Med det sidste europæisk-monetære træk, hvis det altså er forsøg på etablering af euro som mulig reservevaluta eller afregningsvaluta i en eller anden udstrækning på linie med den amerikanske dollar, sker der intet reelt løft af Euro-union. ”I givet fald vil der være to iskageboder i stedet for én på omtrent den samme badestrand. Forklaringen metaforen er at boderne udbyder betalingsmidler for at kunne leve højt på andre landes varer i stedet for at udbyde flere iskager og beskæftige egen arbejdsstyrke med at producere flere varer og flere tjenester. Investeringsklimaet er dog langt det bedste i dollarzonen af stranden, og de øvrige varer og tjenester er langt mere konkurrencedygtige i dollarzonen. Den europæiske centralbank er indrettet til at skulle forhindre euro i at falde; den har ingen midler til at forhindre euro i at stige. Skal ECB til at udstede mange flere tilskuds-euro, der ikke dækkes ind af realøkonomien, men skævvrider den yderligere? Underskuddene på de offentlige finanser i Euro-unions to førende lande er af samme størrelsesorden, når sammenlignes forholdsmæssigt med BNP, som det tilsvarende i USA, omkring 4% mod 4,5-6,0%. Hele eurozonen trues af deflation, hvis euroen for eksempel stiger 20% mere, fordi der (primo 2005) er tæt på reel nulvækst eller mindre i de tre førende lande i eurozonen.

Eurasia skal ikke samles

Med sejrende Islam i Europa og et opløst Sovjetunionen er der ingen tvivl om dominansen i Eurasia. Det bliver Kina eller Rusland, når de islamiske områder har taget sig af resterne i Vesteuropa.

Vi konstaterer at USA’s tilstedeværelse i Mellemøsten er en realitet, mest for USA’s egen sikkerheds skyld, Europa signalerer ikke udpræget meget enighed i omgangen med terror og midlerne i mod den.

Turkmenistan, Usbekistan, Tajikistan og Kirgisistan indeholder formentlig de hidtil største olie- og gasforekomster i verden, og landene, der har opnået selvstændighed efter Sovjet’s fald, ligger tæt på, to af dem endog med grænse til Kina og Indien, der forventes at være de næste mange års vækstområder nr. 1 og nr. 2. De første tre olieledninger til vækstområderne er etableret.

Havde man i EU forventet at dette tomrum uden mange indbyggere og nogen forsvarsmidler af betydning skulle udfyldes af Rusland eller af de større centralasiatiske republikker igen, af Iran eller Kina, så kan man godt forvente om igen.

”… DET STORE SKAKBRÆT – Den amerikanske overlegenhed og dens geostrategiske Bud, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Basic Books, 1997:

Det store skakspil: De allerførste ord i bogen: ”Lige siden kontinenterne begyndte at interagere politisk for vel 500 år siden, har Eurasien været verdensmagtens center”. Eurasien er alt land øst for Tyskland og Polen; det strækker sig hele vejen gennem Rusland og Kina til Stillehavet. Det omfatter Mellemøsten og det meste af det indiske subkontinent. Nøglen til kontrol over Eurasien, siger Brzezinski, er kontrollen over de centralasiatiske republikker. Og nøglen til kontrol over de centralasiatiske republikker er Uzbekistan…”

”…Brzezinski slår tonen an i sin strategy-gennemgang ved at beskrive Rusland og Kina som de to mest betydningsfulde – næsten supermagter – hvis interesser kunne true USA i Centralasien. Af de to, opfatter Brzezinski Rusland som den mest seriøse trussel. Begge nationer afgrænser Centralasien. I en mere under-ordnet sammenhæng beskriver han Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Iran og Kazakhstan, der skal styres af USA som buffere og kontravægte mod og til russiske og kinesiske træk for at kontrollere olie, gas og mineraler fra de centralasiatiske republikker, Turgmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan og Kirgisistan…”

USA pådrager sig en mamutgæld p.g.a. krigsudgifterne i Mellemøsten; muligvis en så stor gæld, at renteforpligtelserne kan standse andre væsentlige udgifter for landet for en tid. Her skal det huskes at US-gælden indtil videre er hægtet på Kina og andre fjernøstlige lande, der har opkøbt US treasury bonds i billionvis. Dollarzonen kan imidlertid forvente en voldsom forbedring af sit samhandelsforhold p.g.a. dollarfaldet. Om denne zone er på vej mod en mere sund dollarværdi, var det værd at foreslå det eneste der mangler:

Et fælles redskab, så vi undgår krise på krise, dybere og dybere, og som samtidig sikrer at betalingsmidlerne bruges til det, der i sandhed er deres eneste brugbare formål. De klassiske økonomer som for eksempel David Hume og John Stuart Mill påviste i 1700-tallet, at hvis der ikke er orden i pengemarkedet, vil der ikke blive orden på varemarkederne. Uden en internationalt vedtaget monetær ordning, der må være i de store handelslandes interesse, går det med sikkerhed galt.

Meget tyder på at der er fire muligheder, når der vippes:

1. guld og anvisninger på guld

2. rent papir

3. få andre til at holde sine midler oppe

4. påtvinge andre at bruge ens midler

Behov for indførelse af reelle valutakurser:

Det gældende internationale pengesystem indtil 1971 var ikke den pengeordning, som Englands hovedforhandler længe havde fastholdt skulle være det gældende efter krigen. For at kunne beskytte mod kriser og inflation anviste J. M. Keynes et internationalt emissionsorgan med en ikke fuldt omsættelig international pengeenhed, der kunne købes for guld, men ikke omvendt. Kun ved at staterne frivilligt standser inflationsorgierne og statsgældsætningen eller tvangsdevaluerer og lader pengemængde og kredit styre af andre, kan der bringes harmoni i det internationale betalingssystem, hævdede Keynes. Incitamentet til spekulation fjernes samtidig. Et monetært måleinstrument uden tilhørende banksedler til fastlæggelse af reelle valutakurser, og ikke egnet til at fortrænge de nationale valutaer. Reelle valutakurser er de nuværende nominelle valutakurser korrigeret for inflation. Inflation har vi set i sidste halvdel af 1900-årene er et udpræget skadeligt fænomen. Har inflationen gjort et lands varer mindre konkurrence dygtige, kunne landet blot devaluere den nominelle valutakurs og på den måde høste fordel af at landets værdier afsættes i et andet bytteforhold med udlandet. Uanset om denne trafik gradvist måtte gentages for at have virkning – dog med større inflation til følge – var det ikke desto mindre vejen landene gik i næsten straks efter den Anden Verdenskrig og genopbygningen. Det skal være muligt for lande at køre med inflation i en afgrænset periode, fordi visse strukturelle eller udviklingsmæssige ting skal bringes på plads. Her skal det så sikres at der åbnes mulighed for inflation uden at denne inflation ikke kan ramme andre lande. Landet med behov for inflation skal devaluere straks og forud. Det er nemt at indregne inflationen i valutakursen. Herved er alle beskyttet effektivt mod inflation og også deflation, hvor den negative vækst kan føre til stilstand, hvis de monetære indgreb ikke foretages i tide, som vi så det i 1930-erne. Der må ikke bringes nogen national valutaenhed ind i dette internationale pengesystem. Vi har haft et lignende system under den såkaldte guldmøntfod, der særligt knyttede sig til industrialismens fremkomst og tidlige udvikling samt verdenshandelen via City, London. Guldmøntfod var omdrejningspunktet, men guldet var samtidig en handelsvare og havde derfor ikke en fastlagt værdi i sig selv, men den var bestemt af udbuddet og nationalbankernes efterspørgsel, i sidste ende politisk.

En international møntenhed lidt tilsvarende ECU – oprindelig den frivillige europæiske møntenhed udstedt fra et emissionshus, der kunne veksles til efter behov, men til det foreliggende formål kun en regneenhed. En regneenhed i en offentliggjort, fastlagt mængde og fastlåst værdi, en afregnings- og reserveenhed. Ikke noget salgbart værktøj, der påvirkes af udbud og efterspørgsel. Endelig skal både debitor og kreditor pålægges rentebetalinger ved udlån til udviklings- og andre lande med den nye reserveenhed som sikkerhed, så vi undgår udlån ud i den blå luft, og således at når det går galt, skal almindelige borgere ikke snydes hver gang, og finanskriserne vælte ind over den ene udviklings- eller misinformerede udviklede nation efter den anden. Der skal simpelthen være en nationalbank for hele verden, hvis der fortsat skal være verdenshandel. Længere er den ikke. Det er simpel logik som enhver kan forstå: at vi ikke kan kontrollere nationale valutamarkeder med en centralbank, hvis de internationale monetære redskaber er en multi-sammenblanding fra alle nationale markeder.

Intet nyt under solen

21. marts 2007

J. E. Vig, cand. oecon.

22. oktober 2006

Money to jihad


The European Union donated $342.8 million to the Palestians in aid in 2005 — or, more accurately, $612.15 million when all 25 EU governments is included.

Even the United States has more times donated millions of American tax dollars to the Palestinian Authority, though not at EU levels and nothing after Hamas took over. In July 2005, as a response to the Islamic terrorist attacks on London a few days earlier, leaders of the G8, the group of influential industrialized nations, offered the Palestinians some $9 billion, dubbed an “alternative to the hatred.”

“We know the tactics to avoid pushing them closer to Iran, but we certainly wonder when it begins to smell.”

Supplements:

Euro and Oil:

https://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/05/25/euro-float-in-oil/ (English version)

https://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/05/20/euro-flyder-i-olie

Invited Terror:

https://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/06/16/invited-terror/

Caliphate or more tightened Western rule:

https://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/10/07/caliphat-or-more-tigthened-western-rule/ 

Jihad-History:

https://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/06/16/culturel-meeting-or-clashes-with-the-great-caliphate/

Fjenden har opbygget hær i Europa:

https://danmark.wordpress.com/2006/06/13/fjenden-har-opbygget-europa-h%c3%a6r/

Sonia

7. oktober 2006

Caliphate or more tigthened Western rule


Valg mellem Kalifat eller strammere vestligt styre

“Eller kun om begrundelserne for Irak-krigen foran scenetæppet på de europæiske TV-stationer ? “

Hvad arabiske midler og Europa angår, skriver Bat Ye’or i Eurabia, og The Euro-Arab Axis: “De arabiske lande bidrog med store summer til universiteter, centre for islamiske studier, internationale kommunikationsagenturer, private og regeringsorganisationer, for at vinde verdensopinionen.” http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/mani.html .

Fra Jerusalem Post – en boganmeldelse af Bat Ye’ors Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis : “How is it that ten percent of France is Muslim, 15% of Denmark is Muslim and close to half of the births in the next generation will be Muslim? Imperious mosques and lawless Muslim neighborhoods dot the landscape of major European cities. And Spain willingly and meekly chose to acknowledge its Islamic past, and that pro-Arab opinion is rampant and anti-Israeli sentiment vitriolic.”

Euro flyder i araber-olie, medens landene som Euro er konstrueret til at holde oppe har bevæget sig tæt på nulvækst med enorm arbejdsløshed siden den indførtes. EU er muligvis bidrager indirekte til terror: http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/euroolie.htm ,  http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/ncen.html og http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/euara.html (read also below). 

Islam on its way

 These past 60 odd years the West has been on the defensive trying (ineffectually) to keep Islam at bay and Islam has been on the offensive their declared aim being to convert by armed force the infidels except the Jews whose eradication from this planet has been (with Europe’s quiet acquiescence) pronounced, save young Jewish maidens destined to be parceled out to the harems of the faithful. It was in 1915 that the Caliphate (aka the Ottoman Empire) decided to exterminate her Christian-Armenian subjects (1.6 million by conservative estimate) and incidentally, showed their Germans allies the proper way to conduct genocide; and on Sept 9th, 1922 in the port of Smyrna they butchered Armenians, Greeks and Jews, sparing neither age or sex, to the tune of 100,000 (?).

It was shortly afterwards that Turkey, now a secular republic expelled all the Greeks from Anatolia where they had been living since the days of the Greek city-states.War does indeed make strange bedfellows. The Caliphate’s allies, Germany, Austro-Hungary & Bulgaria, Christian nations all, made no attempt whatsoever to help their co-religionists. In 1915, Germany had several division stationed in Mesopotamia who could easily have stopped that slaughter, but the only nation to protest that holocaust was the United States but as she was, military speaking a nullity, the protest was simply ignored.

As an aside, when the Turks had finished butchering the Armenians and were about to start on the Jews, the Germans stopped them. Go figure.But Islam as a whole went on the offensive in 1947 when Britain (then still Great) abandoned her imperial responsibilities when she allowed India to slide into anarchy, 700,000(?) of her subjects brutally murdered and tens of millions driven from their homes in a state of beggary, a calamity for which Mahatma (“give us chaos”) Gandhi that apostle of non-violence, must share the moral responsibility together with Lord Louis Mountbatten of Britain & Mohammed Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League and, incidentally, helping to usher in the first of the religious wars that are even now raging all over this planet and which finally came to these shore on Feb. 26th, 1993. In all these religious wars, with the exception of Northern Ireland, Islam has been the aggressor.

One item amongst dozens should suffice. In the 1960s Islam exploded in both Indonesia as well as Malaysia in righteous wrath against the Zionist-Imperial Infidel, but as there were no Jews and very few Westerners to kill, the Chinese had to play the role of the victims and butchered they were in the tens of thousands, and now that the U.S. once again has moved against Jihadistan, the Chinese may very well be called upon to act again as victims.

In the Western world new mosques are going up every day; everywhere where Islam rules, the synagogues, some dating back to Babylonian times have already been shut down and such churches that are still open are on sufferance.

Equally, wherever Islam has seized power all the Jews have been expelled from territories where they have been living since Babylonian, in some cases Assyrian times, and such Westerners that are still there are either diplomats, journalists or Western renegades selling their expertise to Islam.

In the West, every major and many a minor university has at least one chair devoted to Islamic studies every one of which are staffed by Islamic scholars. How many Islamic universities have departments of Western studies? And how many (if any) of them are staffed with Western scholars?

On September 11th, 2001, when New York & Washington were successfully attacked, (Islam 19, Infidels 3,000), the Arab Street went delirious with joy and not just in the Middle East but also in all Islamic enclaves in Europe. And how did the West respond? The opinion- & decision-makers fell all over themselves in their haste to explain Islam to the infidels, to the point that His Holiness, the Pope, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Britain went to the Mosques, and assured us and more important, themselves, that this is not a religious war. Unfortunately, the other side insists that this is a religious war and that they mean to win it.

Islam tried three times, Poitiers, 732, Vienna 1588 & 1683, to conquer Western Europe by force of arms and each time they were turned back—just. But now, there is no need for Islam to march for the third time on Vienna, nor burst once more across the Pyrenees for the enemy (is there a more appropriate term?) is already within the gates. Europe is and continues to be inundated by a tidal wave of asylum-demanders & illegal immigrants none of whom bother even for an instant to hide their venomous hatred of the West and all it stands for; and the governments of Europe are paralyzed by political-correctness, inertia or sheer moral cowardice to stop that invasion.

In France, a junior minister admitted, that the government was afraid that their local Muslim population might have gone on a jihad should France have decided to join the United States in going to war with Iraq or any other Muslim nation. For the time being, the French government tries to deflect the jihadists by throwing them their Jewish citizens as a sop, but it is only a matter of time before the holy warriors get tired of torching synagogues and kosher shops and turn their attention to churches (as happened once already in England) and wine & pork shops. (Anybody noticed how ‘quiet’ the Arab Street has become since Jonathan put on his hobnailed boots and kicked butt?)

In Holland Islam has achieved that critical mass of 10% – (IoD: at least 10% multiplied with 1.5-2.0 in Denmark) and a 10% minority full of passionate intensity & burning with fervor to spread the word can always achieve mastery over the apathetic 90% who have lost faith in their institutions and traditions; aided and abetted by Islam’s useful idiots, the European intelligentsia (God, what a hateful Russian word) who in their relentless culture war against the West are doing invaluable service to ensure Islam’s victory by making the West lose trust in their institutions, denigrating her accomplishments and making them ashamed of their past. (Treason of the intellectuals?)

In Britain, what the Spanish, French & Germans tried to do and failed; Islam succeeded and did so without firing a shot. There are now places in Britain where the Queen’s writ no longer runs but Sharia rules. This loss of sovereignty was amply demonstrated in 1988 when the ruling Ayatollah of Iran issued a death sentence against one Salmon Rushdie the author of the Satanic Verses. The Muslims of Britain made it quite clear that the pronouncement of an Iranian cleric took precedence over the laws of Britain (which goes some length to explain why Britain had to drop the ‘Great’ from its title). By the way, I understand that there is a bitter joke making its round in Britain that Europe will soon be renamed Eurabia.

And how has Europe responded to these and other threats? The European Parliament has recently passed legislation that will make a letter like this a criminal offence both to the writer as well as to the recipient should the latter fail to alert the authorities. In Germany, the dominant power of the European Union, this is known as Anmeldepflicht.

Postscripts

What would have happened had Islam won the battle of Poitiers (and it was a dammed close thing)? Let Edward Gibbons (1737-1794 author of The Decline & Fall of the Roman Empire tell it in his own inimitable way:

A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland: the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.

Although Islam was stopped cold at Poitiers and Vienna, she conquered and held in subjugation for several hundred years present day: Albania / Bosnia-Herzegovina / Bulgaria / Crete / Cyprus / Greece / Hungary / Montenegro / Portugal/ Romania / Serbia / Spain / and that’s just in Europe.

Although Islam promises every hour on the hour to slaughter Jews wherever they can be found, the principal victims of their righteous rage to date have been: Christians (2 millions minimum) / Buddhists / Hindus (700,000?) / Sikhs / Muslim (Shiites vs. Sunnis) Jainists / Parsis / Pagans / Animists / etc. etc. etc. with Jews at the end of the line. Islam does not discriminate; it is an equal opportunity killer.

It is a perfect indicator of the time we live in that the leaders of the West: political, scholastic, ecclesiastic, and above all, the pontificators of the Fourth Estate simply cannot bring themselves to face, let alone to state the obvious fact that the West is immeasurably superior to Islam. Harmony in music / perspective in painting / painless surgery / the eradication of many diseases that had plagued mankind throughout the ages / the abolishment of slavery / the harnessing of electricity, of steam and oil / the principles of flight, including into outer space / of photography / household plumbing (let us pay homage to the lowly Western plumber for it was he, not the medical profession, who banished cholera, dysentery & typhoid) / telephone, television & the computer/ the list goes on and on. Further, the universal languages of the arts & sciences are: English, French, Italian & German all Western tongues. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. Islamic students go to Western universities in their tens of thousands, very few Westerners attend Islamic universities save for religious studies.

E. David Litvak 

EU millions: Was aid handed to terror gangs?

The European Union [ EU ],  is a representation of the efforts of Comrade Bill Clinton, continued by Pres G. Bush, in a program called "The Free Trade Area of the Americas" or "FTAA" for short.  Opposition by some of the South American countries has caused the current administration to shorten it down to "The Central America Free Trade Agreement" or "CAFTA" for short until they can club the recalcitrant SA countries into submission.  The current disastrous NAFTA would be replaced by the FTAA.The person who is the prime negotiator is a fellow named Robert B. Zoellick, currently on the Federal Payroll of the Executive Branch, in the titled position of "US Trade Representative", a Cabinet Ranked job.  He is a long time member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Since the FTAA/CAFTA is being patterned after the EU, you may wish to subscribe to several organizations in England and other countries who are trying to save the Sovereign Nation Of England, and their own, from becoming another slave state of the EU and its soviet styled government. France and Germany have teamed up with Belgium to become the total dictator of Europe. The organizations that are fighting to keep England a sovereign nation are listed at the end of this document. For God and Country, FSI, DEO VINDICE, Chet. IT BEGAN with a suspicion in the mind of two MEPs, Ilka Schröder and François Zimeray, that European Union funding for the Palestinian Authority was being diverted into the pockets of terrorists. By the time the EU working group had finished its investigation, it had uncovered evidence to show that Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian president, had personally signed cheques to people linked with terrorist activity. This week, fresh allegations have surfaced that money intended for use by the Palestinian Authority for legitimate purposes has been siphoned off by corrupt officials, ostensibly to pay the wages of 7,000 non-existent staff. But rather than prosecutions and the recovery of misappropriated funds, the investigation has concluded with a whimper, petering out in two conflicting reports and an inconclusive debate.What it is has provided, however, is a salutary lesson in the Labyrinthine workings of the EU and the possibility that future donations may be Subject to rather more scrutiny than that which applied to the $246 million (£134 million) handed over without question to the Palestinian Authority.Ms Schröder and Mr Zimeray's determination uncovered a murky world where money from the EU's constituent states was channelled into the pockets of dubious figures in the Palestinian Authority, and from there into the pockets of Palestinian terrorist groups. They were unlikely champions of such a cause: Mr Zimeray was a French socialist MEP; Ms Schröder, a German Green MEP and later an associated member of the Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left. What they shared was a frustration with what they regarded as the EU's implicit support for the Palestinian Authority, regardless of whether it was right for wrong.Ms Schröder was in no doubt about what had happened to the money. In an open letter, she wrote: "It is a well known fact that the EU-funding for the Palestinian Authority was channelled to a black budget. It is also well known that the Palestinian Authority has financed a murderous anti-Semitic terrorist war against Israel. Israel provided the European Commission with proof of this use of EU-funding in May 2002. Since then, the commission denies having any knowledge of this specific use of the money and the Conference of Presidents successfully stalled an inquiry committee on this issue." But from the start, it was an uphill battle. Chris Patten, the EU foreign affairs commissioner, was against any investigation, arguing it amounted to ignoring Palestinian suffering. Ms Schroeder could not stomach that argument: she accused Mr Patten of "winking approval of terrorist attacks funded by the EU".Mr Zimeray and Ms Schröder pressed ahead and, after four months, had the 157 signatures they needed for a vote on the matter. Mr Patten's attempts to persuade Euro MPs to drop the matter were rejected, and the parliament set up a working group to look into the claims.  Already, officials in Brussels were admitting they could not account for every penny spent by the Palestinian Authority. When Mr Patten protested that there was no need for further investigation because the International Monetary Fund supervised the EU's funding arrangements, Thomas Dawson, the director of the IMF's external relations department, made it clear it could not monitor or control every item in the budget. Even Salam Fayyad, the Palestinian finance minister, admitted the system was open to corruption. Meanwhile, the working group ploughed on with its investigations, uncovering plenty of evidence to suggest money had ended up in the wrong pockets. The evidence suggested that money paid to the Palestinian Authority may have found its way to the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a group responsible for hundreds of attacks on Israeli targets. There was even evidence to show Mr Arafat had signed payment orders for thousands of pounds for people directly involved in terrorist activity. But when it came to their conclusions, they were divided on how much credence to give to the evidence they had uncovered, with seven members believing it was not of sufficient quality to stand up in court and six prepared to accept it.   Ms Schröder was unimpressed with their efforts: "The working group was established in order to downplay the importance of the issue," she wrote in a letter to the group.Charles Tannock, the Tory foreign affairs spokesman in the European Parliament and one of the authors of the minority group's report, called it a whitewash. He said the majority report had chosen to ignore signed payment orders by Mr Arafat to the tune of $39,000 (£22,000) "to people linked to terrorist activities or their families" on the basis that they amounted to circumstantial evidence only and did not prove that payments had been made. "I am very suspicious about giving money in cash to a theatre of war where corruption is endemic," he said. Mr Tannock said that he believed about 270 million (£178 million) had been paid to the Palestinian Authority over a two-year period, with the money going into a single account. "It was all paid into a pot to finance a variety of things, some of them legitimate and some dubious," he said. He demanded a committee of inquiry into the payments, but the request was vetoed and it is unlikely further investigation will take place.But even as the working group was winding up, new evidence was emerging about the fate of the EU's cash. Mr Zimeray and Ms Schröder had alsopersuaded OLAF, the anti-fraud office of the EU, to begin its own investigation into what had happened to the money. Its report is not yet out, but already evidence is emerging that some of the money was used to cover the salaries of thousands of security force employees who existed only on paper.An examination of the payroll of the Palestinian Authority's national security force, under the command of General Haj Ismail Jabber, revealed that about $2 million (£1.1 million) a month was paid to General Jabber to cover the salaries of 37,000 security force members. The payroll showed there were only 30,000 people on the staff. The EU working group may have concluded its investigation, but others are still searching for the truth. Ms Schröder and Mr Z imeray spotted the flaws in the argument this time, but there will have been other occasions, many more, when money has flowed out of the EU coffers without check or balance.What appears to have prompted these two MEPs to place the greater good of the EU above political convenience - and there is no doubt that both would have found life easier over the last year had they ignored the voice of their consciences - is a sense of outrage at the knee-jerk response of the European Parliament to automatically back the Palestinian cause without pausing to consider what would happen to the money they so readily handed over.Too often in Europe decisions are taken without fear of being held to account: on this occasion, the guilty parties have merely had a warning shot fired across their bows. Fraud, corruption and mismanagement are woven into the fabric of the European Parliament, say its critics. It can only be hoped that this time, however hard senior EU powerbrokers attempt to place political convenience ahead of financial probity, it is not the end of the story. 

End of Msg from Chamberlain.

gchamberlain@scotsman.com  

Sonia

25. maj 2006

Euro Floats in Oil


Three Steps Forwards Two

Backwards

Petroeuro In The World Economy,

And What We Really Need

“So-called hard euro is lighter than oil, that is the reason why it floats”

Danish version

Contents

From monetary system via dollar-dominans to floating nominal currencies.

The domain of dollar extends.

The dollar seceded from the gold Petrodollars IMF – debt-crises. How USA dealt with its debts-increase.

The US-world-reserve-role changing Japan in debitor’s trap.

Euro and European Union Euro and its primery objectives.

Fear of competition narrows the rationality.

Euro-Union and globalization.

Two suppliers of internaitonal monetary means.

The need for introduction of real currency rates.

Recommend this file

From monetary system via dollar dominans to floating nominal currency rates: The international system of payments after WW2 that USA and Britain actual decided, while the war was going on, in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA, tranformed the dollar to a so-called reserve currency; most of the worldtrade was agreed upon in dollars. Central banks all over the world kept a considerable reserve amount of dollars in order to be able to protect the national currency when too much imbalance in foreign trade occurred, and other currencies were expected to be measured secured in terms of the dollarvalue. The value of dollar was connected directly to the goldprice, $35 per ounce fine gold. The dollar dominans in the world trade alone implied even larger dollar reserves in the central banks all over the world. The Marshall Plan after the war secured the rebuilding of Europe; but it actually did not cost USA a cent, because the dollars (-bills) obviously are much cheaper to provide than other goods and services. When dollars returned by the accounting for goods and services in USA they made trade impacts on the American economy, otherwise they did not. But almost none of them returned. At the same time USA could import almost unlimited and pay with more dollars that did not return either. Large amounts of dollars that piled up for example in consequence of the positive result of the balances of trade were invested in interest-bearing and currency secured American government bonds and other assets. With this system the leading economic power was tempted to accept large deficits on balance of trade equalized by missuse of the means of payment via this issuing of money. The result was that US received the foreign goods for free. This arrangement simply could not continue in the long run or could it? Without going into details, inflation and state-debt was introduced as an obvious possebility among the professional politicians, who did not worry particularily about nation and tradition, and certainly did not know the hard conditions. Devaluations on behalf of the nation, and the initiatives of the state itself were also included in this dismantling, and devaluations in cooperation with IMF came like af thief in the night in a row of cases, because the really needed of necessity had to be done in time to prevent this vicious spiral to continue in the nations: Finance crisis upon finance crisis around the globe.It was certainly not new phenomenons that were introduced by the Bretton Woods System. At the peace conference, the Wienna Congress in 1815 and the bankructcy of Denmark 1813 followed a devaluation of 90%. The collapsed monetary system from 1944 that has not yet been replaced by a new one actually had some bad temptation for the politicians built in depending on the character of the leading figures. Of other decicing impacts in the long run the following have to be mentioned:

  • Dollar and petrodollar dominans in international trade with artificial values at home and abroad – totally independent ofthe real domestic economy
  • Competing European euro-system based upon an official approved politician-phantacy on the former German stability and growth, now among indebted nations with adjustment turned downwards via wage rates and minimum standards of ecology and of social level.
  • The way to real economic recovery of Europe was prevented, in addition the unlimitation of the markets was encouraged without any self-regulating mechanism of competition directed out of the euro-zone, and combined with a clossusish lack of competition in the other markets except for the market for disguised subsidies to a too expensive structure
  • Indebted nations around the globe after two generations
  • An explosion of the amount of means of payment and speculation that would not be possible without the built in defects originating the from birth of the Bretton Woods System, to such a degree that the real economies in the nations are totally secluded from the system of international payments, that they were meant to protect in order to protect the nation

The domain of the dollar extends: On the other hand the arrangement was binding for USA, externally, in the world of realities characterized by practical rebuilding of production-capacity, markets and defending efforts under the Cold War. And the rest of the world could redeem dollars at the goldsprice as required, granted that USA as an economic superpower was able to secure the dollar-value settled in gold. USA was the only country to guarantee and carry out the redemption of dollars for gold as it had the largest gold-reserves. Western Europa quickly recovered, and the growth lead to large European export surpluses that at the same time created an dollar-accummulation in the export countries. As early as in the 1960s France began to redeem dollars for gold, and others followed. At same time USA was engaged in the Vietnam War and elsewhere. This brought the deficits on the public finances in an uninflated heavenward flight of the time. In 1967 the drain of the gold-reserves in USA and Bank of in England in Britain to a critical point. That France and other European countries definitely according to the agreement increased the redemtion of dollars for gold brought the dollar under pressure, given that the goldprice measured in dollars continuing was kept unchanged. It was expected that USA would devaluate the price of the dollar in relatively to gold with a continuous bigger and bigger pressure from the demand for gold, and also from USA’s deficit on the balance of trade plus the still unfinanced war-deficits on the domestic public budget. At the same time most of European countries gradually “dyed their money issuing in dollar-green”, and they also began the inflationary growth that went into stagnating production and employment with still higher inflation to end up with a rate of short interest of 21%. This was indeed the characteristic economic consequences of the welfare that substituted wealth in Scandinavia in the 1970s.

Dollar seceded from gold: In 1971 Britain also began side by side with France to order redemtion of dollar for gold. Instead of contnuing towards a predictable collapse of the market USA left the redemtion of gold in august 1971. That actually meant that the international monetary system built up a little on gold but much more on dollars dismantled as forseen by almost everybody (among others the Norwegian negociators in Bretton Woods), and the world changed to the system with floating nominal rates of currency[1][1].You may also call this international financial anarchy, if you have understood that the grocer of that time could not sell the scales, and still claim to supply his freshly ground weighed coffee.

Petrodollars: OPEC is a cartel that agrees upon a common oil price and distribute quotes of production-capacity among each other. OPEC was founded by Iran, Irak, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela September 1960 (later on more countries joined) with the clear objective to “coordinate and unite” the oil policy in the member countries. After the Teheran Conference 1971 (where the price-settle-initiative was tranfered from the oil companies to the exporting governments) the buyer’s market for oil closed down. Now the need for a floating dollar rate emerged, if the economic worldpower USA – still with trade deficits – should not lose ground. October 1973 OPEC sent price on the oil to the sky with rise of 400%, and at the same time imposed an embargo that forbid shipping of oil to every country that had supported Israel in the “Yom Kippur War” against Egypt, and OPEC reduced the production with 25%. USA had previous reached an informal agreement with Saudi Arabia that the country could invest in USA, if USA assisted Saudi Arabia develop its economy. Apart from the tremendous oil prices-rises – there was another smaller one in 1979 – there was nothing catastrophic in the oil countries requiering more for their oil, when the reserves were limited. The profits earned by sale of oil accounted in dollars floated into bank accounts in Britain and USA, when the OPEC-countries simply could not find a better investment for the petrodollars right away. The problem arising was to allocate the money back into the productive circulation – recycle petrodollars -, now that the West rode on wave of combined stagnation and inflation at the same time. This new phenomenon – the Philip-Curve moved, but not until reality gave inspiration to loosen the premises of the theory – was caused by issuing of money-units, irreversible increases in wage rates and deficit on the public budget. [The reason why was not the oilprice rises even though that was persistently claimed (for 10-15 years) – if not it could be claimed that so-called crisis followed from the heavenward fligt of the oil prices had to be renamed to the normal state. So-called euro-dollar-bonds were issued and became the guarantee foundation for private lending from private banks to the Third World with the Bretton Woods organizations – IMF and the World Bank – in a the role as mediators. The developing countries could not provide money to the more expensive oil from other sources[2][2].

Petrodollar were the foundation of a huge number of hopeless lending-arrangements, and thereby also the propellant for at lot of debt-crises in the 1980s, and in the 1990s also among more developed nations in Latin America, Asia and Europe.

Who created the risks, and who transferred these risks, and who had to bear the resposibility in the end?

In February 1945 USA made an agreement with the Saudi king about military protection of Saudi Arabia, if USA was given priority to the oil sources of the country. Even though the oil occurences were nationalized in 1976 ARAMCO (an association of Arabic and American companies) was controlling the production and the markets for oil outside Saudi Arabia. Surplus of petrodollars was invested in American government bonds. This market is obviously a power potentiale in the hands of the world’s leading millitary power. An example: In 1980 Iran’s and Libya’s assets in USA was confiscated, and recently organzations dealing with international terrorism suffered the same fate.

IMF – Debt Crises: With the organization of  IMF – International Monetary Fonds – a link in the international monetary- and ledingsystem, it often was a merciless fight of debt collection against weak founded states in the Third World. It was underlined from a few sources that the yearly new borrowing in Western Europe actually was bigger that the total debt of the developing countries in the 1970s. If we take the question of creditworthiness: the single states that decided the agreement of the Bretton Woods System paid in money, but most were given guarantees[3][3] in the foundations of IMF on behalf of the nations’ taxpayers, and in accordance to how large an economy the nations represented, so the responsibility for the many lending-dispositions in private banks, particulary to the states in the developing countries was rather often in quite another place than the initiative. How these lending-arrangements and other international arrangement was established, you can among others read in Frederick K. Listers‘Decisi on-Making Strategies for international Organisations: The IMF Model’, Denver, USA 1984.

How USA dealt with its debts-increase: About 70% of world trade is contracted in dollars. Oil is the most important good in the world, all countries have to get oil, and if they do not have oil they have to buy it, for dollars. That has been the reality for the last 40 years. Recycling of petrodollars have simply been the price that USA have requiered of the oil producing countries for having USA to tolerate an oil exporting supplying-cartel OPEC since 1973. For about two decades USA’s deficit on balance of foreign trade has increased most of the time. Today it amounts to about 25% of the American Gross Net Production (GNP) or about $2.5 (European) billions or $2.5 (American) trillions. In 1988 the balance of trade was in balance, and at this time USA was a creditor nation. Since 2002 the yearly public deficit has been $450-600 (American) billions, or 4.5-6.0% of GNP compared with 1.3% of GNP in 2000, when both federal and the states’ deficits are incounted. Russia and Asiatic central banks in China, South Corea and Japan have bought American government bonds and other assets in accordance with more than 60% of the total public domestic deficit, for more than 1 trillion the last three years to keep up the dollar against Asiatic currencies that actually reduces the domestic issuing of monetary means substantial compared with what it must have been without the Asiatic demand and everything equal. It also appears from the fact that inflation is apparently still under control (in spite of the fact that inflation has a delay before it reach full strenght), and the employment is rising substantial in the fall of 2004. November 24th 2004 the dollar hit the lowest point compared with Yen for the last 9 years and the lowest point compared with Swiss francs for the last 4 years. China began selling dollars of a substantial amount November 27th 2004.In the first half of 2004 more than $201 billions assets were bought up by foreign central banks. Of these are $180 billions American government bonds. In Japan are large parts of the bonds placed as security for Japanese banks that otherwise would have gone bankruptcy, more below. In the case China, it is the result of a large new export of price-competing goods to USA, for example outsourced American, and also Chinese productions that result in the large accumulation of dollars. They are invested in American government bonds and real investments outside China. The currency rate of Chinese yuan is linked to the dollar rate – and this is not just an implication of the buy up of government bonds. This means that the yuan without the US-bonds perhaps would have been in the same boat as USA, when the dollar may fall further. A still continuing fall of about 20% or more of the dollar would lead to a fall in the stock market prices, and also lead to higher dividends, when foreign entries move investments away. 40% of the American government bonds are owned by foreigners, like 25% of the business bonds, and 13% of the US ordinary shares. Behind the placement of the US-debt you also have to take into consideration that China’s demand for energy for the industrial sector is expected to be dubbled in the next 15 years, and the Chinese demand for electricity is expected to dubble in the next 10 year, and to be multipied with four before 2019. Until now USA has been the only country that can increase its purchasing-power on the world market by issuing more dollar-notes. The US-import is about 50% or in dollar-terms or $310 billions more produced produkts than USA export (yearly). That put the country in a special situation, characterized by both power and vulnerability. Without this central, very peculiar status of the dollar and a consequent and constant flow of capital-investments from the whole world, the country would quickly heel over in a catastrophic crisis of balance of payments.

The US-world-reserve-role changing: From November 2000 Iraque began to settle its oil sale in euro, and at the same time it converted the reserve-foundation “Oil for Food” with $10 billions to euro after an agreement with UN. Between 2001 and February 2003 almost the entier Iraqi oil export was paid in euro, about $30 billions. In the same period the euro increased relatively compared with dollars with 30%. Saddam Hussein had already offered concessions of oil extration to France, China, Russia, Brasil, Italy and Malaysia. Saddam Hussein had until then only used Eruopean banks to the limited sanction program, “Food For Oil”. He awarded the Palestinians with 1 billion euros in 2000. A short time later EU awarded the Palestinians with 90 million euros as a subsidy to show its friendship with the Arabic World, if Israel canceled its payments at that time. A few days later the European Investment Bank made an agreement to lent Syria 75 million euros after eight year with sanctions of have been shut out from making businesses with this country. A little earlier, August 2000, EU donated 1.7 million euros as a subsidy to Eritreans, Etiopeans, Somalis and repatriated asylum seekers from Yemen after the war with Etiopia and famine. Subsidy from EU in euros again: not long ago the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi proposed an European version of the “Marshall Plan” which he characterized as a generous act to rebuild Europe. He proposed to give the Palestinians a help of a value of 6.2 billion euros in a period of five years.[These last things are included to characterize the motives and the understanding of the situation among the promoters.] From November 2000 to November 19th 2004 dollars decreased relatively to euro with 34.5%, from December 1st 2002 to November 19th 2004 with about 23.5%. A lower rate of dollar made the dubbled result, by lowering the enormous deficit on the balance of payments (an improved balance of trade and an improved balance of the flow of investments), and improve the competitiveness of the exporters that would result in higher investment, and higher employment in these exporting businesses. I addition a lot is pointing in the direction that the petrodollar adventure has ended caused by the increasing import in the oil producing countries, and the reduction of the relative share of OPEC in the total oil export.

Iraque has the second-largest known reserves of oil among the nations of the world. 45% of EU’s oil import comes from oil sources of the Middle East, 80% of Japan’s comes from the Middle East, that has 60% of the world’s known reserves. USA is not dependent on those oil sources. The shift to petroeuro that is mentioned by few is predicted to have huge effect only if Great Britain and Norweigh introduce euro that would result in North See “Brent” and the Norwegian oil supply being settled in euro. Shortly after Iraque’s move, Jordan began bilateral agreements with Iraque. August 2002 Iran converted more than the half of its currency reserves in Forex Reserve Fund to euros, and China also began to convert some of its currency reserves from dollar to euro. At the same time Russia dubbled the stock the Russian Central Bank of euro to 20% of the total $48 billions. An Iranian senior speaker of the oil industry Javad Yarjani noticed in a speech to the Spanish Ministry of Finance that “it was possible with a increasing trade between the Middle East and the European Union, and that it could be suitable to settle prices in euro. This would create more ties between these blocs of trade with an increasing trade, and at the same time promote a very needed European investment in the Middle East.”

The British Empire was brought on even keel via the need for Britain to import food, when the domestic agriculture was driven out by the industri. The American Empire may be brought on an even keel via the need for USA to import manufactured goods, when the domestic production was driven out by the financial services.

While the dollar has decreased since 2000 the price of oil settled in dollars has increased. The euro-price of crude oil remained almost the same in the four years period. It just don’t seem logic that this result should occur of simple by chance, and it does not seem to be a surprise either that others could begin supplying a dominant reserve currency. The money plans of EU has not been held entirely top secrete. It is most likely to be a result of considerations of thoroughly planning and design. It also seems as if OPEC react to the dollar depreciation in a most natural way; by increasing the oil price precisely to the point in accordance with the lost they would had to bear is removed.

Japan in debitors trap: The rate of Japanese yen has decreased 5-7% a year compared with euro from 2001 to 2004, notice, a relative decrease to dollar of about the half. This means a yearly depreciation that makes Japanese products more expensive in Japan, and the country is far from being selfsufficient with food and energy. Japan has stagflation and did not get through the last stockshare-bubble-crash in Asia in 1997, because the banks in Japan continued to throw new money after bad money with guarantee of the government, mostly based on American government bonds. February 10th 2002, Observer notes: Japanese consumers flock round the banks to convert the quickly depreciating yen to gold bars. There is fear for the banksystem to collapse, when the deposit guarantee of the government is being removed in Mars. We wrote in 1999 that Japan-government tried to reuse the Japanese economic policy from 1920-1927: to issue billions of yennotes and new credits with which the banks bad loans could be bought up, the assets then had to be overestimated much like in the Weimar Republic in Germany. Now it unfortunately was I the period 1920-1927, where Japan handled precisely the same problem just as wrongly as now in the late 1990s that it would have the one to refer to, if we had to learn from experience. It is not true that history repete without further. But if leading figures use the same false way thinking on the same problem (for example as an act of bad faith), then the superstitious are tempted to believe that history repete.[And it is not totally false, apart from the fact that ignorance’s blind fate must be classified in categories of belonging to an earlier or the coming middle age.] Such a incomprehensible policy was really carried out, also concentrating at negative rates of interests and guarantee of the state for the banks to get the prices to rise “by stimulating the production in this way” in the misunderstood Keynesian way. The falling yen has really got helplessly stuck in a debt trap. The public debt is $5 trillions, a little less than the debt of USA that November 19th 2004 got its borrow-limits increased to $6.4 trillions. More state-debt is continuing contacted at still higher settled prices, even though it just increases the debt. The debt trap is closed, and there is no easy way out. Japan which regardless is an important industrial nation is also a substantial importer of oil. Japan’s surplus of trade from sails of cars and other products was used to import oil settled in dollars. The surplus was invested in American interest bearing government bond and other assets. The government of Japan owns 15% of the American Treasury assets. G-7 was founded to secure Japan and Western Europe within the dollar system. From time to time in 1980s statements about the three currencies – dollar German mark and yen – emerged from different Japanese sources that they should divide the world’s role of reserve under the floating nominal currencies. Until now the dollar remained the dominating.

Euro and European Union: European Union with common compulsory money units, and a constitution is being established among EU’s 25 member-states now. That it is difficult to obtain adequate consensus among the Europeans about the common compulsory money unit is perhaps unnecessary to state. To establish an European monetary union right now, where all European countries are indebted more than ever – apart from perhaps two European countries outside EU -, dominated by unsatisfactory activity and employment anywhere in EU, and even negative growth in the three leading countries, France, Germany and Italy for the second, perhaps for a third year is more than a feat; it is an artificial, ideological construction. The national currency sovereignity has been abolished in the eurozone. The objective is obviously price stability and growth in the eurozone. For years we were lead to understand – in the open – that the currency reform guaranteed price-stable growth, even though the rules about the new currency in the Maastricht-treaty (for example: article 104C) tells something quite different; particulary concerning the newinvented, partly inconsistent and irrelevant so-called claims of convergency that can be overruled, if the Council of Ministers does not estimate the offence to been substantial. The countries – France and Germany – that put these claims into the treaty were the first to offence the rules about deficits, and the relative magnitude of state-debt compared with GNP – they did not even honor this selfchosen claim either without several manipulations with the respective budgets (redemtion of gold and seeling of pension duties) in both the countries, Germany and France, when they invite other countries to qualify for joining the monetary union on the same conditions. In 2004 it continues in Germany with selling of the pension duties of the civile mail-servants.

Euro and its primery objectives: To assume the common compulsory money unit in any way should reflect the real economic in EU, and serve the union we obvious have misunderstood. Corresponding to Spain’s fatal administration of the gold extracted in Latin America in 1500s it looks as if the euro in the best Mercantilistic way via trade settled in euro for example oil from the Middle East is meant to generate the moment that created change in a Europe with not less than 20% unemployed (official 9%) or expelled, and an enormous state-debt that you no longer can make an unambiguous sketch of. Jean Monnet – one of the founding fathers of project – exactly claimed in the 1950s that the compulsory monetary unit would be used to make the union real in full scale. It was the form, before the contents that counted, we can conclude. If for example one of the Maastricht claims of convergence about the magnitude of the state-debt that must not exeed 60% of GNP should have meant anything serious, between the half and two thirds of countries could not have met this claim without to accept crises of stability. So much can be extracted of those real informations that are released time after time. Apart from Mercantilism that according to history ended with the Napoleonic wars stability and development cannot be measured as an index of prices or some procent-figure. Or when some quantitative standards have been registered, then you can talk about a stable currency (with reference to the five Maastricht-claims of convergence). Stability include the dynamics of the capital formation, security of the investment process, economic growth, education and new technology and high productitiy in a state to claim that its leaders have taken the voters and the nation seriously. All this cannot be obtained or be calculated as some simple static concept. France and the most of the other countries were against the so-called stability pact that could have secured that the central bank acted like the old German Bundesbank, and kept the reins tight, but from quite another starting point. It was decided at the summit of Dublin in December 1998 to drop the stability pact, and France made too large deficits on the public finances in both 2002 and 2003 compared with the Maastricht provisions. The struggle about who should point out the president of ECB (European Central Bank) ended with France. The German Bundesbank was out of step with the German political, financial and industrial elite. But the bank was very popular in the German public opinion. Therefore the politician Helmuth Kohl was very hard pressed between the German and the French Establisment. The French socialists had built in their claims to the subsequent treaties. Now Kohl has gone, and the new German kanzler is a centralist himself. EU has in return recommended a German as leader of IMF. Kohl also had to eat that there were no more talk about pure automatic sanction against a country that makes continuing deficits. Now the claims is activated (according to Maastricht-treaty) when 2/3 of the weighed votes in the actively participating EMU – countries vote for sanctions. France also got approved that a so-called stability-council, and at the same time a directly political rolle built into the monetary policy so that for example guiding lines for the euro currency have to be fomulated politically now.

In addition to introduce the pure (economic) stability pact without order in the member-states’ economies would lead to real political instability. If the amount of money and credit cannot be debated in the whole eurozone, because it has to be decided by a hard ECB, the consequences would be so terrifying hard in some parts the union that political instability would inevitable be the result. Italy and Greece are obvious examples.

To defect this you can then introduce the more well-going countries to hand over “some surplus” from the public finances or “commit themselves to this in advance” (but the problem is that no state can or will do so) to the bad-going Italy, Belgium, Greece, Portugal and Poland. This means on plain English that the public expenditures have to be controled euro by euro in the whole eurozone. This is common financial policy. On that assumption every extravagant expenditure, and a lot more will certainly be stoped. 

If you should judge by the falling D-Mark and the rising Italian lira in 1997-1998, the markets had to have the impression that a soft euro was being established. There was a completely unknown but collosal amount of lira that should have an eternal determined rate in euro in July 1998. How this could happen without a soft euro, would be intereting to have explained, and there were lots of other problems pointing in the same direction.

Already in 1996 you could foresee that the euro would be a so-called junk-currency – that was what the speculators called it -, if Germany, France and Britain should take over the Italian enormous mountain of debt. This would lead to result that ECB had to guarantee the solvence of both Italia, Belgium, and all the other heavily indebted member countries, for example Greece, and the countries that could be expected to join EU in the Eastern Europe at that time. In this way an alliance would be created that would press ECB, and get it to act as if it still controled the monetary policy without really doing this. That was what happened. Real EMU-stringency after the book multiplied by three or four is what should be expected, if we assume economic stability should succeed in the present situation – without a strong lever from outside. But this would imply the lost of political stability as the relations are and may be expected to develop, and the disappointment with the whole project would lead to even more resistance against the project. That is the reason why they still act as if.

Fear of competition narrows the rationality: Globalization means the unlimited mobility of markets included the capital market. The globalization will destroy the democratic society and the welfare state, many maintain. The only reason why is lack of an international monetary system that would have prevented the worst. The total mobility of capital undermine the abilities of the states to regulate. Especially the concern for the labor market: Untercuting and cutbacks have to absorbe what threats to disappear of jobs, among other things by outsourcing. The globale markets of financing are not subject to a regulating mechanism of competition, and they causes crisis upon crisis – Asia, Mexico, Russia and Latin America. The crises will become deeper caused by the paper-mountain of the state-debt that widening the difference between nominal and real values in every community in the long run. And because you have chosen to sell the tape measure instead of using the tape to measure with according to its purpose. It gets worser when all the leaders of the states continues to borrow net more and more. The crises tighten the social pressure with requirements of cutbacks. The pressure of the crises either lead to the dismantling of the welfare states or change them into linked defending blocs (currency blocs like euro, dollar, yen or renminbi-zones) or relapse to the old enemy-pictures that characterized the national states earlier, perhaps a combination of both scenaries. With the dismantling of the democratic founded national- and social state the globalization releases itself at last, because the politicians cannot stand for that the populations/the voters of their countries have to bear heavier and heavier burdens just to offset the worst.

Euro-Union is the prototype of this development. Its bad hidden dubble-motive is a) fear of the dollar-dominans and –competition and b) fear of the united Germany with matching D-Mark-regime.

Fear always build on a false analysis. The US-dollar does not threaten the European market shares of the world trade, but Europe’s lack of knowledge, technique and initiative, especially Europe’s inertia when comes to reforms and renewels. The hardness and the strenght of the D-mark did not prevent the development and the integration of Europe, but the since “Maastricht” the aim was abolishment of the D-mark, and that has then happened. The explanation was that D-mark should have driven the countries in the eurozone (now) into a tight negative development against reforms and with social limitations. Alone these fallacies and false assumption do not allow any realistic expectations about a hard euro. The inflation was programmed in advance. It is perhaps possible to blow more air into it by leting it float in oil at the beginning, but the collapse is then going to be even bigger. All member countries are deeply indebted, and all of them run with deficits.The national governments lost their instruments of management right at the beginning of the euro (currency rate, interest rate, amount of money and flexible budget). They can no longer secure the values of the money, and regulate the labor market, and the social- and ecological standards that the same policians had introduced. Differences of structure and of competition will with governmental suspension be equalized by the market. The battlefield number one is the labor market now, and the social and ecological systems. The labor market suffers from the diminishing of the middle class, the wage rate and social cost competition originate from the workers in the southern and eastern EU-povety-zones, and an inevitable liquidation of the decided national union-wage rates and the minimumstandards of the social level till now. The market sweeps them away, the employers uses more and more their potential of threat that is to move their productions to especially favourable (wage rate, social- and ecologic cheap) EU-zones. Wage rates, social standards and claims of environment in Euroland have to be harmonized downwards. It is the naive imagination of socialdemocrats, the folk socialists and unions that these things must be better after they have signed the Maastricht-treaty. In Euro-Union the social policy has resigned forever – and it is happening with full accept of the socialdemocrats, the folksocialists and unions.

Euro-Union and globalization: Euro-Union is not the remedy against the employment crisis of globalization. There is nothing special about thisglobalization; that is an apophthegm; international competition is the right word. Euro-Union strengthens the power of the capital, and helplessness of the state in the role where nothing real can be done to the unemployment without to have the needed instruments. It is a progress towards the 19th century (here the instrument of ruling were searched too), not towards the 21st century. Euro-Union is not even a counterbalance against the unsocial tendenses in the globalization, as the incompetent analysers from the left maintain; it strengthens them further. It simply forces the working life towards the monetary commandos. The European Central Bank (ECB) has to pursue the totally same policy in the 12 different structure countries, without the possebility to resort to the equalizing of the nominal currency rates. To prevent the capital from leaving the eurozone the central bank will have to increase til interest rate; but this decreases the activity and rises the unemployment further. Such an union must end in the conflicts among the states, from which there is no no help to find – if the euro-union is not rebuilt to a transferunion or an federal state with public equalizing between old and new member states, something like the patchwork USA or the German Federal Republic, but without the D-mark. When the transmission of these models show themselves impossible or they meet resistance the question arises: Are there alternative models that can save the world peace? As it runs now: Europe and Arabic world has already begun to cooperate economical, as it was forecasted in North-South-Dialog from 1968 and the European-Arabic Dialog from the midd 1970s. Egypt, Jordan, Marocco and Tunesia decided last year to establish a zone of free trade[4][4], and Algeria, Libanon, Mauretanien, the Palestinian authority and Syria are being invited to join this big zone of free trade. Egypt is expected fully admited in this group of free trade. However EU has negociated with 12 Miditerranean countries as a part of the so-called Barcelona-Process about cooperation between EU and its neighbors around the Miditerranean towards south. The aim in the long run with this Barcelona Process is to establish tighter bond of trade and social questions as well as of political kind. This will lead to the creation of the Euro-Miditerranean-Freetrade-Zone consisting of 27 countries in 2010.

It is possible that the European productions in future may be transferred to North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, until they come up, and we are put totally down. It is a question if the populations submit to that.

Two suppliers of internationale monetary means: With the last European-monetary move – if it is an experiment of establishing of the euro as a possible reserve currency or currency for price-settling to some extent in line of the American dollar – no real lift of Euro-Union will happen. “If the occasion should arise there would be to ice cream booths on almost the same bathing beach. The difference to the metaphor is that the booths are supplying monetary means to be able to live on the products of other countries instead of supplying more ice creams, and employ its own working force to produce more products and more services. The climate of investment is far better in the dollarzone of the beach, and the other products and services are far more competitive in the dollarzone. The European Central Bank is organized to prevent euro from falling; it has no means to prevent euro from rising. If ECB are going to issue more subsidy-euros that are covered by the real economy, the economy is further twisted. The deficits on the public finances in the two leading countries of euro-union are of the same magnitude, when compared relatively with GNP, like the corresponding in USA, about 4% against 4,5-6%. But here you have to take into consideration that the whole here is threathened by deflation, if the euro increases 20% further, because the growth in the three leading countries in the eurozone is close to zero. The dollarzone can expect a tremendous improvement of its tradebalance. If this zone is perhaps going towards a more sound value of the dollar, it tempting to propose the single lacking arrangement. A common instrument to prevent crisis upon crisis, deeper and deeper, and at the same time secure that the monetary means are used to what truly is their only useful aim. The classical economists, for example David Hume and John Stuart Mill proved in the 1700s that without order in the monetary relations, there will not be any order in the markets of products. Without an international order of money and credits that is in the interest of the big trading countries, it will go wrong.

The need for introducing of real currency rates: The ruling monetary system until 1971 was not the agreement that the chief-negociator of England maintained for a long time was best to be chosen. To protect against crises and inflation J. M. Keynes showed an internationalt emission-agency with an international monetary unit that was not fully negotiable. It could be bought for gold, but not the other way round. Only if the states of their free will stop the inflation-orgies and the state-borrowing or devaluate (by compulsory) or let the money amount and the credit be ruled by others, it is possible bring harmony into the international system of payment, Keynes maintained. The incitament to speculation is removed at the same time. A monetary measuring instrument without banknotes to determine real currency rates, and it is certanly not suitable to force out national currencies. Real currency rates are the present nominal currency rates corrected for inflation. We have seen in the last half of 1900s that inflation is a distinctly harmful phenomenon. If inflation had made a country’s products lesser competitive, the country could just devaluate the nominal currency rate relatively to all other countries, and in this way benefit by the lower price of its export products, and higher prices of the import products; the exhange-relations to other countries has then been changed. Regardless if this trafic had to be repeated to have any effect – except for inflation – it was the way countries used to go not long time after The Second World War and the reparation.

There must a possibility for countries to make inflation for limited periods, caused by some structural or developing matters that have to be arranged. Such a possibility must excist, but in such way that other countries are not harmed by this inflation. The country that need inflation have to devaluate at once in advance. It is easy to incount inflation into the currency rate. By this are all other countries protected against inflation, and also against deflation, where the negative growth can lead to standstill, if the right monetary intervention are not carried out in time, as we saw it the 1920s and 1930s. No national currency must be brought into the international monetary system. We have had a much similar system under the so-called gold-coin-basic that was especially connected to the appearance of industralism, its early development, and the worldtrade via City, London. Goldstandard (a looser system) became the pivotal point, but the gold was at the same time a good of trade and therefore it did not have a settled value in itself, but the price was decided by supply and demand from the central banks, lastly a politically decided. An international monetary unit a little corresponding to the ECU – originaly the voluntary European currency unit emitted from an independ organ; it could be exchanged when needed, but for the present aim just a unit of account. A unit of account in an published, settled amount, and at a settled price, an account and reserve unit. No saleable instrument that get impacts from any supply or demand. And international arena where both debitor and credit have to pay interest on loans with the new reserve unit as guarantee, so we prevent lending out at random, and if it does go wrong, ordinary people should not be cheated every time, and it should also prevent crises of finances from overturn one deloping or misinformated country, one upon the other. You can call it a nationalbank of the world as a foundation for the international trade. It is simplicity that everyone can understand: we cannot control the national/international markets of currency from a national central bank, if the international montary unit is for sale, and thereby has become a multi-lend of all national currencies.

I knew that when I was 21 years old in 1971, and USA ”left the gold” as it was expressed, but selfconfidence grow with experience. I learnt little of economics that offered me a more solid ground to argue from.

And we perhaps have to go through another catastrophe before the leaders understand, what their predecessors did definitely wrong, or were lead to make definitely wrong from their in many respects marionet positions.

Supplementary readings:

Economics of Tide:

Big recessions and recoveries in the 20th century : http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/tida.html (part 1)

Big recessions and recoveries in the 20th century (including the role of private company with anonymous ownership):http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/tidb.html (part 2)

Goldstandard in all combinations:

Gold as an international unit of account for values – a historical statement: http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/gol1/gol1.htm (part 1)

Gold as an international unit of account for values – a historical statement: http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/gol2/gol2.html (part 2)

Keynesianism, the misused of J. M. Keynes theories:

J. M. Keynes’ theories, the moment that actual inspired the last dependence: http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/keyne.html.

November 27th 2004,

M. Sc. (Economics) Joern E. Vig, Denmark,


[1] We remember how the nominal rates of currency sometimes were devaluated by one country or a group of countries at the same time. We were sure it must be some kind of advanced swindle with the values. We wondered that the other countries accepted it, but we did not fully understood the consequence of fraud then, to all of us. Other arguments than the need for working capital were certainly used.[3]The roles were exchanged from the beginning, The World Bank was no bank, but a foundation, and the foundation was a bank, so let’s describe the first: ”With a share capital of $10 billion distributed among 100,000 shares that should be taken over by the member-states participating in the maintenance of the bank (mine: that certainly was not a foundation neither from the beginning or later on). Admission to this was given to states, that were members of The International Monetary Foundation, but later on other states were given admission too. That was the reason why only $9.1 billion of share capital was supplied at the founding meeting. 20% of the capital should be paid in, of which one tenth in gold (in reality then just 2%), occupied countries could postpone a quarter of payment in gold for 5 years. The main task of the bank was via (mine: private) lending or guarantees to promote the reparation after the war og hereby contribute to the delopment of the international trade and increase the productivity and living standards in the long run. Direct lending should be effected, if the borrower could not achieve a private loan or a gurantee on fair conditions. The management of the bank should be organized after the same principles as the principles in the International Monetary Foundation.” The former Danish Prime Minister Viggo Kampman wrote so as a civil servant in 1944. The italicized originates from the present author. [4]Free-trade-considerations usually result in more than free trade, when we look behind the political rhetoric, and let the experience count.