Danmark

18. april 2013

Besynderlige ting oplyses om fødslerne i Danmark – OECD burde interessere sig for det med samme entusiasme som OECD interesserer sig for den danske forbrugsøkonomi


 

Besynderlige ting oplyses om fertiliteten i Danmark

Fertilitet er det gennemsnitligt forventede antal levendefødte børn pr. kvinde i en gruppe kvinder i aldrene 15-40 år på et givet undersøgelsestidspunkt forudsat at aldersfordelingen er fastholdt. Fødselsraten er derimod blot antallet af fødte i forhold til populationen i de enkelte år uanset aldersfordelingen.

 

OECD burde ligeledes forundres over det, der følges op på her.

I Velfærdskommissionens analyserapport ─ Fremtidens velfærd og globaliseringen, marts 2005, der over alt refererer til tal fra 2003, 3. kapitel, side 97, 3. afsnit læses:

”Den samlede fertilitet for indvandrere fra mindre udviklede lande er på ca. 3,3 barn pr. kvinde, mens det tilsvarende tal for ind-vandrere fra mere udviklede lande er 1,5 barn pr. kvinde. Disse niveauer fastholdes gennem fremskrivningen.” Her er selvsagt ingen kildeangivelser i Velfærdskommissionens analyserapport, marts 2005, side 26: Fremtidens velfærd og globaliseringen.

”Fertilitetsniveau for kvinder fra mindre udviklede lande 3,248 i 1997.” Kilden: http://www.im.dk/publikationer/udl2001/kap01.htm (filen findes ikke længere). Bemærk, med hvilken ”overbevisende præcision” sidste tal var angivet i de officielle publikationer. Danmarks Statistik i 1998 angav således det danske fødselstal pr. kvinde til knap 1,8 barn pr. kvinde og de fremmedes til 3,248. Desværre kan dette ikke give resultatet 1,72 (i total fertilitet i 1998, jvfr. tabellen nedenfor) ved nogen positiv andel af fremmede.

10 år senere: http://www.cphpost.dk/news/national/88-national/45603-increased-birth-rate-for-danish-women.html

Wednesday, 06 May 2009 15:40 KR News Foreign women gave birth to an average of 3,04 children in 1998, but that figure fell to an average of 1,94 (2008).

Garbi Schmidt from the National Research Center for Welfare (tidligere benævnt Socialforskningsinstituttet) said that the falling figures were as a result of immigrant women adopting the norms and values of fellow Danish mothers. Danish women set birth record. Published 11.05.11 14:38 Denmark leads industrialised nations in number of births Denmark’s birth-rate has grown the most out of any other industrialised country since 1984 a new study from the OECD shows. With 1.84 children per woman in 2009, the birth-rate has risen…

Det er ganske fejlagtigt. Tilmed ganske udokumenteret bortset fra totalfertiliteten eller samlet fødselsrate, der så røg ned 1,73 igen 2012.

Nu er der tale om fødselsrate, der ikke er fertilitet.

Garbi Schmidt finder vi i tilstødende sammenhæng. Abstract er hentet fra Internettet på http://www.sfi.dk 20 år i Danmark: En undersøgelse af nydanskeres situation og erfaringer. Udgivet i 2000. Spørgsmålet om etniske minoriteters ligestilling i det danske samfund er i disse år genstand for stor offentlig diskussion. I hvilket omfang får nydanskere en erhvervskompetencegivende uddannelse, og hvilke uddannelser tager de? Hvordan vælger de at stifte familie og opdrage deres børn? Under hvilke former bosætter de sig? Hvordan vedligeholder de deres kulturelle arv? Vælger de at få dansk statsborgerskab? Deltager de politisk i det danske samfund, eller er de kun i ringe grad med i samfunds- og medborgerskabsprocessen? Dette er spørgsmål, som denne rapport tager op. Rapporten bygger på både besøgsinterview efter et standardiseret spørgeskema med ca. 700 nydanskere med oprindelse i Tyrkiet, Pakistan og det tidligere Jugoslavien, samt på dybtgående intensive interview med 15 nydanskere fra de samme etniske minoritetsgrupper. Alle svarpersoner er ca. 30-35 år og har boet i Danmark i mindst 20 år. Rapporten er en opfølgning på en tidligere rapport om samme gruppe unge danskere, som Socialforsknings-instituttet udgav i 1989. Den beskriver således også, hvordan nydanskernes livssituation i Danmark har ændret sig gennem de sidste ti år. På hvilke punkter går det nydanskerne bedre eller ringere end dengang? Hvilke sociale og kulturelle mønstre holder nydanskerne fast i – eller bliver holdt fast i – og hvilke er under forandring? Rapporten forsøger endvidere at lade nydanskerne selv komme til orde: Hvad er deres holdning til integrationsindsatsen i det danske samfund; hvor mener de den er lykkedes og hvor bør den ændres?

Garbi Schmidt & Vibeke Jakobsen: 20 år i Danmark. En undersøgelse af nydanskeres situation og erfaringer. Socialforskningsinstituttet 00:11. 322 sider. ISBN 87-7487-646-5. 245,00 kr. inkl. moms. Telefon: 33 48 09 46 – Fax: 33 48 08 33. Kultursociolog Eyvind Vesselbo stod for projekt-rapporten, der absolut ikke er en undersøgelse af fertiliteten. Han har selv kommenteret den i aviserne og på TV i ugen sluttende den 5. november 2000.

Det viser sig der er tale om noget fuldstændig værdiløst materiale i forhold til f.eks. kravet om en repræsentativ funderet fertilitetsundersøgelse: Cirka 700 nydanskere med oprindelse i Tyrkiet, Pakistan og det tidligere Jugoslavien plus 15 nydanskere fra de samme minoritetsgrupper, hvoraf de sidstnævnte har deltaget i dybtgående intensive interviews. Nydanskere er blevet den politiske korrekte (ganskevist vildledende) betegnelse for personer, der har fået tildelt dansk statsborgerskab ved lov. Alle svarpersonerne er ca. 30-35 år og har boet i Danmark i mindst 20 år. Dette kan bestemt ikke betragtes som noget repræsentativt udvalg af gruppen af fødende udlændinge i Danmark fra mindre udviklede lande. Fertiliteten kan end ikke fastslås blandt de udvalgte/interviewede, idet den valgte gruppe ikke aldersmæssigt omfatter alle de fertile aldre (15-40 år).

Dette ligner rent bestillingsarbejde. Der er ikke tale om nogen dokumentation, og derfor kan der kun opfordres til, at man ikke anskaffer gennemgangen. Kultursociolog Eyvind Vesselboe ville på trods heraf i 2006 fortælle vælgerne i sin egenskab af folketingsmedlem, at det er noget han har fundet på, at den officielle danske befolkningsopgørelser ikke kan bruges. Men her hang han fast i sin egen medvirken til det, som her netop er vist.

På Danmarks Statistik (DS) har vi: http://www.dst.dk/Statistik/Nyt/emneopdelt/%20nytsingle.%20aspx?countid=8299&ci=true&pti=1 (filen findes naturligvis ikke længere), og her læser vi: I Danmark var den samlede fertilitet i 2003 på 1,76 barn pr. kvinde mod 1,72 i 2002. 23. august 2008 i JP: Mens kvinder fra ikke-vestlige lande for 14 år siden fødte 3,41 (1996) børn i gennemsnit, nedkommer den samme gruppe i 2007 med knap to børn. Tæt på det danske gennemsnit på 1,85 børn pr. kvinde.

 

Fertiliteten falder ikke fra 3,41 i 1996 eller fra 3,248 i 1998 til knap 2 i 2007. Det bliver meget værre endnu – se 3. afsnit, 1. linie nedenfor med rødt.

 

Politiken hævdede den 7. december 2009, at ikke-vestlige har en fertilitet på 2,11, hvortil den skulle være faldet fra 3,41 siden 1993 (eller muligvis rigtigt er 1996)

I Politiken læser vi den 7. december 2009 (http://politiken.dk/debat/analyse/article853442.ece ), at fertiliteten for oprindelige danskere i 2008 udgjorde 1,82, hvortil den angiveligt skulle være steget fra 1,69 siden 1993. Det er ikke muligt at fremfinde mindste dokumentation hos Danmarks Statistik.

25. juli 2010: “Nu føder ikke-vestlige kun 1,6 barn i gennemsnit, danskerne hævder de føder 1,9 barn”, skrev bl.a. Information og også Berlingske Tidende den 25. Juli 2010. D.v.s.: At nu (2010) føder danskerne angiveligt 1,9 barn pr. kvinde mod tidligere (for et par år tidligere) angiveligt 1,7 barn.

Det sidste skal antagelig oversættes til: At nu føder de etniske danskere og et stort antal ikke-vestlige papirdanskere og deres børn og børnebørn i gennemsnit 1,9 barn pr. kvinde mod tidligere (for et par år tidligere) angiveligt 1,7 barn. Resten af de fødte sættes i forhold til det optalte/benævnte antal ikke-vestlige.

Ekstrabladet hævdedede den 27. oktober 2010: “Danske kvinder føder færrest børn i Norden. Danske kvinder føder i gennemsnit 1,8 barn – og dermed er fødselsraten den laveste i Norden. Det viser nye tal fra Nordisk Statistisk Årbog 2010. Danmark ligger dog over det øvrige Vesteuropa i det såkaldte EU-15, hvor fertiliteten er 1,5 barn pr. kvinde…” Vi kan ikke finde nogen dokumentation, hvor Ekstrabladet hævder den findes. Statistics Sweden SCB anfører totale fertilitet til 1,90 1,98 1,94 1,91 1,88 1,85 1,77 fra 2011 til 2005 ifølge : http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____26041.aspx . EB’s oplysning stemmer muligvis ikke: Fra 2000 til 2003 var Sveriges totale fertilitet 1,53-1,55, fra 2004 til 2011 var den 1,66-1,67 med et ganske abrupt spring i 2004 i følge : http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=sw&v=31. Det er simpelthen så latterligt.

 

2011: Kontorchef Anita Lange, Danmarks Statistik hævder, at hun laver statistikker over udviklingen i fertiliteten blandt ‘indvandrerne’ og ‘efterkommere’.

 

Der findes ingen tilgængelig fordeling af en fødselsårgang i Danmark på oprindelse hos Danmarks Statistik. D.v.s. der findes ingen tilgængelige rådata om fødsler, der overhovedet betinger, at fertiliteterne blandt indvandrere og efterkommere kan opgøres med offentlighedens indsigt; d.v.s. med dokumentation. MEN af DS’s varedeklaration 2010 fremgår:

Hvis vi netop kendte det antal fødte i f.eks. 2009, som DS ikke vil anføre som ikke-vestlige indvandreres nyfødte, “skal dette antal forøges med en faktor 1,231, meddelte DS i varedeklarationen. Hvordan kan DS vide dette?

Og hvis vi kendte det antal fødte i 2009, som DS ikke vil anføre som ikke-vestlige efterkommeres nyfødte, skal dette antal forøges med en faktor 1,921, meddelte DS i varedeklarationen. Hvordan kan DS vide dette? DS ligger nødvendigvis inde med disse ikke-officielt tilgængelige oplysninger, for ellers kunne DS ikke anføre disse særegne trans- eller overgangshyppigheder så præcist. ‘Er der travlt ved håndvasken’? Hvis de fødendes fordeling på danskere af fødsel, på danske statsborgere samt børn af disse og på udenlandske statsborgere ikke hemmeligholdtes, ville hele korthuset bryde sammen.

I 1997 og i 2009: Indenrigsministeriet: http://www.im.dk/publikationer/udl2001/kap01.htm (denne fil findes naturligvis ikke længere): ”Fertilitetsniveau for kvinder fra mindre udviklede lande 3,248 i 1997″. Er dette fertilitetsniveau fortsat fastholdt og ikke-vestlige forudsattes at føde omkring 1/3 af en fødselsårgang i 2009 var de danske kvinders fertilitet lavere end i 1983, hvor den var 1,377. Det var 1,24 barn i gennemsnit pr. kvinde, som svarende til eller lidt højere end stambefolkningernes etniske rater i landene omkring os i Vesteuropa.

Uddrag af Danmarks Statistiks (DS’) netside om varedeklaration: “Varedeklaration: Befolkningsfremskrivning for Danmark. Her var følgende link http://www.dst.dk/vejviser/dokumentation/varedeklarationer/emnegruppe/emne.aspx?sysrid=000773&timespath=2%7C , der naturligvis ikke er aktivt længere.

Forudsætninger for DS’s 2009-fremskrivning: Fertilitet:

Samlet fertilitet Kvinder med dansk oprindelse: 1,900 konstant.

Indvandrere fra vestlige lande: 1,598 i 2009 stigende til 1,750 i 2040, derefter konstant.

Indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 1,946 i 2009 faldende til 1,900 i 2040, derefter konstant.

Efterkommere fra vestlige lande: 1,572 i 2009 stigende til 1,750 i 2040, derefter konstant.

Efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 1,883 i 2009 stigende til 1,900 i 2040, derefter konstant.

Overgangshyppigheder: En del af de børn, som indvandrer- og efterkommerkvinder føder, kommer til at tilhøre gruppen af personer med dansk oprindelse, fordi den ene af forældrene tilhører denne gruppe. Derfor er der beregnet nogle såkaldte overgangshyppigheder for indvandrer- og efterkommergrupperne. Disse andele angiver, hvor stor en del af de nyfødte af henholdsvis indvandrer- og efterkommerkvinder, der vil blive klassificeret i gruppen af personer med dansk oprindelse. I 2009 fremskrivningen er overgangshyppighederne fastsat til: Indvandrere fra vestlige lande: 59,4 Indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 23,1 Efterkommere fra vestlige lande: 87,3 Efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 92,1

Forudsætninger for 2008-fremskrivningen: Fertilitet:

Samlet fertilitet Kvinder med dansk oprindelse: 1,854 i 2008 stigende til 1,900 i 2030, derefter konstant.

Indvandrere fra vestlige lande: 1,615 i 2008 stigende til 1,750 i 2030, derefter konstant.

Indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 1,970 i 2008 faldende til 1,900 i 2030, derefter konstant.

Efterkommere fra vestlige lande: 1,571 i 2008 stigende til 1,750 i 2030, derefter konstant.

Efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 1,861 i 2008 stigende til 1,900 i 2030, derefter konstant.

Overgangshyppigheder: En del af de børn, som indvandrer- og efterkommerkvinder føder, kommer til at tilhøre gruppen af personer med dansk oprindelse, fordi den ene af forældrene tilhører denne gruppe. Derfor er der beregnet nogle såkaldte overgangshyppigheder for indvandrer- og efterkommergrupperne. Disse andele angiver, hvor stor en del af de nyfødte af henholdsvis indvandrer- og efterkommerkvinder, der vil blive klassificeret i gruppen af personer med dansk oprindelse. I 2008 fremskrivningen er overgangshyppighederne fastsat til: Indvandrere fra vestlige lande: 64,7. Indvandrere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 20,5. Efterkommere fra vestlige l lande: 93,4. Efterkommere fra ikke-vestlige lande: 92,3″ (uddraget afsluttet)

På denne baggrund er det måske nemmere at forstå, hvorfor Velfærdskommissionen i 2005 valgte fertiliteten ca. 3,3 pr. kvinde i 2003 og fremover for immigranter fra mindre udviklede lande og 1,5 pr. kvinde for immigranter fra udviklede lande. Det officielle folketal, de samlede fødselsårgange samt den samlede fertilitet antages at stemme, bortset fra fertiliteten ikke bygger på egentlige fertilitetsundersøgelser.

Kilde: Statistikbanken i Danmarks Statistik (DS)

 

Fertiliteten samlet i Danmark i 2012: 1,7332, anført af DS på:

http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/emner/foedsler-og-adoptioner/fertilitet.aspx

Man kan spørge: Er der sket genetiske mutationer i populationen, når man husker definitionen på fertilitet i indledningen?

Totale fertilitet i DK og subtotale fertilitet i delpopupolationer i Danmark forudsætter fertilitetsundersøgelse af repræsentative udvalg ved interviews. Udvalget for interviews skal være stratificeret og omfatte alle de aldersbetingede fertiliteter blandt kvinder i de fertile aldre i den pågældende delpopulation. Der ses ingen sådan officiel fertilitetsundersøgelse udført/offentliggjort i mange år i Danmark. Derimod er det blevet udbredt i flere vestlige lande og også her, at fertilitetsmål udført andetsteds og endog fødselsraterne omregnes til en slags teoretiske fertitetsmål. Ved at korrigere for en mere eller mindre arbitrært valgt aldersfordeling udregnes nogle fertilitetstal. Dette findes ikke holdbart:

 

  1. Fertiliteten forudsætter svar fra kvinderne i de fertile aldre om antal børn, ønsker og forventninger om flere børn på et givet tidspunkt eller i givet kort tidsrum mens interviewene står på.
  2. Fertiliten opgøres ved omfattende interviewundersøgelse til sikring af pålideligheden.
  3. Fertiliteten er ligeledes fx påvirket af kultur, traditioner, love, og givet aldersfordelingen på interviewtidspunktet/i tidsrummet.

 

Professor dr. oecon. Jørn Henrik Petersens valg af fertilitetstal til Velfærdskommissionens arbejde, ca. 3,3 for indvandrere fra mindre udviklede lande og 1,5 for indvandrere fra mere udviklede lande i 2005 vedr. året 2003 og fremover (jfr. 3. afsnit ovenfor i Analyserapporten fra Velfærdskommissionen, marts 2005) stemmer i 2011 med den officielle totale fertilitet, hvis vi forudsætter en delpopulationsandel på 14% fra mindre udviklede lande.

Skandalen fortsætter vildt: https://danmark.wordpress.com/2012/08/30/skandalos-omtalebehandling-af-fertiliteten-international-fordi-vi-er-de-eneste-der-gor-ophaevelser/

De grundlæggende fejlindretninger af det danske befolkningsregister hos Danmarks Statistik: http://www.lilliput-information.com/Befolkningsrelateret%20forskning%20i%20DK.pdf

 

 

J. E. Vig, 18.04.2013

12. april 2013

DU SKAL IKKE KUNNE KONTROLLERE – DER SKAL SKALTES OG VALTES AF HENSYN TIL OVERBEGAVELSERNE

Filed under: Culture, Danmark, Education, folkeskolen, Free Speech, Justice, skoler, Uncategorized — Tags: — Jørn @ 09:40

bella

bella

Det er sørme godt nok

Så var der ti gange flere, der blev smidt ud af dagpengesystemet end overbegavelserne i tinget havde meldt i slutningen af 2012, da dagpengeperioden blev halveret.

Men nu er der fundet en løsning:

Et bredt flertal støtter nu Morten Bødskovs forslag om lov, der skal hindre offentlighedens indsigt i regnestykket for dem alle og den enkeltes indsigt i sin egen sag.

Det burde være overflødigt at oplyse at det opregningssystem, der fortsat anvendes, i de sidste 30 år har været en evig pestilens for a-kasserne at holde styr på med det til følge, at adskillige er blevet udstødt uretmæssigt, hvis de ikke selv kontrollerede falddatoer for dagpengeret og beskæftigelsesgrad yderst minutiøst. At systemet naturligvis er indrettet af de samme overbegavelser, der ikke kan bruge det selv, er måske en overraskelse.

Med 10.000 kr. pr. måned for alle 16-64 årige uden arbejde ville det have været en gevinst for beskæftigelsen og for alle, der har det mindste overblik over realiteterne. Men det er selvfølgelig for enkelt et system for de overbegavede, og desuden skal man nok tænke på den omfattende over- og overflødighedsbeskæftigelse blandt velfærdsfunktionærerne, som det nuværende system trods alt sikrer.  

9. april 2013

TILO SARRAZIN TALER (PÅ ENGELSK) I TRYKKEFRIHEDSSELSKABET OM HVAD HAN SOM TYSKER FORSTÅR VED POLITISK KORREKTHED – TALEN I SIN HELHED


TILO SARRAZIN VED PRISUDDELINGEN I TRYKKEFRIHEDSSELSKABET DEN 6. APRIL

First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  thank  you  for  giving  me  this  award,  which  I  have  gladly  accepted.  Until  2008,  I  did  not  concern  myself  very  much  with  freedom  of  speech.
In  my  career  as  a civil  servant,  board  member  and,  later  on,  politician  I  had  a  reputation of  being  outspoken.  But  that  concerned  mostly  my  professional  field  and  was  therefore accepted.

Everything  changed  with  an  interview  I  gave  in  September  2009  about  the  socioeconomic problems  of  Berlin  and  their  roots,  and  with  a  book  I  published  in  August  2010  under  the title  Deutschland  schafft  sich  ab  (Germany  abolishes  itself).
Its  main  conclusions  are:

– Germany  as  a  nation  is  doomed  by  its  demography.  The  low  and  stable  birth  rate  means  that  every  generation  is  35  percent  smaller  than  the  one  before.
– The  brightest  people  have  the  fewest  children.  And  for  this  reason,  intellectual  capacities  and  educational  achievements  in  Germany  will  shrink  even  faster  than  the  population.  This  is  no  danger  for  a  far  future;  the  process  is  in  full  swing  already.
– The  kind  of  immigration  that  we  have  in  Germany,  mostly  from  Islamic  countries  in  Africa  and  the  Middle  East,  does  not  solve  the  problems.  It  aggravates  them.  Reasons  for  this  are  the  Islamic  cultural  background  and  the  poor  average  educational  performance  of  these  groups,  which  is  far  below  the  European  average,  even  in  the  second  and  third  generation.

Those  conclusions  are  of  course  controversial  –  and  they  were  intended  to  be.
In  matters  of society  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  absolute  truth.  And  I  am  the  first  to admit  this.
I had  expected  a  controversial  discussion.  But  nothing  had  prepared  me  for  the  public storm  that  broke  loose  upon  publication.
I  was  accused  of  advocating  biological  determinism  and  labelled  a  social  Darwinist,  a  racist, and  an  enemy  of  the  people  and  of  social  justice.
I  survived  morally  and  politically  because  of  the  enthusiastic  support  from  large  parts  of the  general  public.  The  new  media  were  very  helpful  in  that  regard.
In  this  case,  the  print  media  and  television  had  obviously  lost  their  monopoly  of interpretation,  and  it  was  plain  for  everybody  to  see.
Realising  this,  many  politicians  started  a  tactical withdrawal  from the debate.
In  the  course  of  events,  I  stepped  down  as  a  board  member  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  –  but  not  before  I  had  been  formally  cleared  of  all  allegations  of  misconduct.
In  the  following  months,  I  thought  a  lot  about  the  controversial  reactions  to  my  book.  My  theory  is  as  follows:
The  code  of  conduct  in  a  society,  which  is  not  laid  down  by  law,  varies  over  time.  It  is  to  a  large  degree  implicit  and  not  subject  to  formal  –  or  even  openly  discussed  –  rules.  But  those  members  who  do  not  observe  it  run  the  risk  of  being  excluded  from  ‘the  good  society’.

The  mechanics  of  political  correctness
Having  and  expressing  the  ‘right’  set  of  opinions  about  certain  scientific,  social  and  political questions  is  an  important  part  of  this  code  of  conduct.
Most  people  want  to  observe  the  prevailing  code  of  conduct  but,  being  busy  with  jobs and  families,  they  have  no  informed  opinion  of  their  own  on  most  matters.

So  they  think  and  believe  what  the  media  say  they  should  think  and  believe.  Politicians,  on the  other  hand,  form  their  understanding  of  public  opinion  by  consuming  the  media.  Most of  them  sincerely  believe  that  voters  think  what  the  media  write  or  say.
Media  are  made  by  people,  and  media  people  recruit  themselves  in  a  process  of  self-­ selection,  much  as  lawyers,  doctors  or  engineers  do.  Polls  show  that  media  people  mainly  listen  to  other  media  people.

Endorsed  by  this  self-‐selection,  media  people  on  the  whole  have  a  set  of  opinions  that tends  to  be  on  the  left  side  of  mainstream  society.  I  don’t  say  this  is  a  bad  thing.
But  I  think  that  this  partly  explains  the  mindset  of  political  correctness.   
Most people  shy  away  from  saying  or  even  thinking  anything  that  is  perceived  to  be politically  incorrect.

So  the  mechanics  of  political  correctness  prevent  the  expression  of  dissenting  opinions, notwithstanding  the  formal  freedom  of  speech.
It  even  stops  the  generation  of  incorrect thoughts.

The prevailing  themes  of  political  correctness  are  deeply  ingrained  in  the  (to  some  degree unconscious)  mindset  of  the  political  class  and  the  media.  Reflecting  on  the  reaction  to  my book,  I  identified  13  themes  which  constitute  the  main  body  of  political  correctness  in Germany.  My  book  violated  every  single  one  of  them.

A list  of  political  correctness  in  Germany
Here  is  the  list  of  political  correctness  in  Germany.  I  think  the  list  describes  the  truth  but it  takes  some  irony  or  humour  to  understand  it  fully.  The  problem  lies  not  in  any  single item  on  this  list  but  in  their  combination  and  rigid  application  to  political  thinking:

1.   Inequality  is  bad,  equality  is  good.
2.   Secondary  virtues  like  industriousness,  precision  and  punctuality  are  of  no  particular  value.  Competition  is  morally  questionable  (except  in  sports)  because  it  promotes  inequality.
3.   The  rich  should  feel  guilty.  Exception:  Rich  people  who  have  earned  their  money  as athletes  or  pop  stars.
4.   Different  conditions  of  life  have  nothing  to  do  with  people’s  choices  but  with  the  circumstances  they  are  in.
5.   All  cultures  are  of  equal  rank  and  value.  Especially  the  values  und  ways  of  life  of  the  Christian  occident  and  Western  industrialised  nations  should  not  enjoy  any  preference.  Those  who  think  differently  are  provincial  and  xenophobic.
6.   Islam  is  a  religion  of  peace.  Those  who  see  any  problems  with  immigration  from  Islamic  countries  are  guilty  of  Islamophobia.  This  is  nearly  as  bad  as  antisemitism.
7.   Western  industrialised  nations  carry  the  main  responsibility  for  poverty  and  backwardness  in  other  parts  of  the  world.
8.   Men  and  women  have  no  natural  differences,  except  for  the  physical  signs  of  their  sex.
9.   Human  abilities  depend  mainly  on  training  and  educations;  inherited  differences  play  hardly  any  role.
10.   There  are  no  differences  between  peoples  and  races,  except  for  their  physical  appearance.
11.   The  nation  state  is  an  outdated  model.  National  identities  and  peculiarities  have  no  particular  value.  The  national  element  as  such  is  rather  bad;  it  is  at  any  rate  not  worth  preserving.  The  future  belongs  to  the  world  society.
12.   All  people  in  the  world  do  not  only  have  equal  rights.  They  are  in  fact  equal.  They  should  at  least  all  be  eligible  for  the  benefits  of  the  German  welfare  state.
13.   Children  are  an  entirely  private  affair.  Immigration  takes  care  of  the  labour  market  and  of  any  other  demographic  problems.

The core of the problem

So  far  the  list.  In  this  condensed  form  it  sounds  like  a  joke.
But  it’s  not  a  joke.  These  are  the  hidden  axioms  of  the  prevailing  political  mindset  in Germany  (and  probably  elsewhere)  as  I  see  them.   Every  item  on  the  list  has  a  high emotional  value  for  those  who  believe  in  it.

The  core  of  the  problem  is:  Partly  moral  und  partly  ideological  attitudes  are  taken  at  face value  and  mixed  up  with  reality.
It  is  a  permanent  task,  I  am  afraid,  to  sort  that  out.

It  makes  me  faintly  optimistic  though  that,  after  all  the  turmoil,  I  am  still  morally  alive  and not,  as  a  person  and  an  author,  ignominiously  buried  and  forgotten.  That  had  certainly been  the  intention  of  the  vast  majority  of  the  political  and  the  media  class.  But,  for  once, the  general  public  publicly  disagreed.
This,  in  itself,  is  a  matter  of  satisfaction  not  only  for  me  but  for  many  people  in  Germany.

The second book

Quite  interesting  was  the  experience  with  my  second  book  “Europa  braucht  den  Euro nicht”,  which  was  published  in  May  2012.
In  this  case,  nobody  could  deny  that  I  am  an  expert  on  the  matters  I  wrote  about.

So they  doubted  –  again  –  my  motives  and  tried  to  discover  right-­‐wing  or  populist elements in  the  book.
This  proved  impossible.  The  historical  reasoning  was  sound. The  economic  reasoning  that  I  applied  was  mainstream  and  adhered  to  strict  logic.
My  warnings  and  misgivings  were  proven  true  time  and  again  by  the  actual  events.  So they  tried  to  “todsch”  the  book  (that  word  is  derived  from  the  German  “totschweigen”).  I often  found  my  arguments  in  print  while  the  source  was  not  mentioned.  But  even  this  was only  partly  successful.
The  book  sold  200.000  copies  und  took  in  2012  the  ninth  place  on  the  bestseller  list  for  nonfiction.

When  I  speak  of  “they”,  I  don´t  mean  the  media  as  a  whole,  but  about  seventy  percent of  them.  The  problem  is  not,  that  “they”  disagree.
I  love  disagreement,  It  is  the  salt  of  every  enlightening  discussion.  And  I  would  be  totally bored,  if  I  had  not  to  struggle  with  disagreement  and  opposing  views.
But  “they”  avoid  the  exchange  of  arguments.

They  don´t  even  read  or  listen  carefully,  if  at  all.  They  try  to  get  to  you  on  a  personal level  –  by  doubting  your  motives,  by  mocking  your  habits,  your  looks,  your  attitude  to  life. The  ultimate  aim  is  defamation.

They  try  to  instill  the  fear  of  isolation  in  all  those  who  might  support  you  and  speak  out for  you  and  your  cause.
And  one  has  to  admit,  it  works  –  at  least  partly:  Most  people  hate  to  expose  themselves in  controversial  matters,  even  the  honest  und  good  hearted  ones.
So,  those  “who  go  with  the  flow”,  get  easily  the  upper  hand  and  dominate  the  climate  of public  opinion.
This  is  nothing  new.  It  has  always  been  this  way.
It  is  part  of  human  nature  to  try  not  to  fall  out  with  the  moods,  the  habits  and  the opinions  of  those  social  groups  –  formal  or  informal  –  of  which  they  feel  they  are  part.
But  it  is  important  that  those  who  disagree,  are  given  space  –  in  a  literal  and  a  moral  sense  –  to  develop  and  present  their  views  free  of  sanctions  of  any  kind.

Each  and  every  progress  in  social  affairs,  in  science,  in  culture,  even  in  fashion  –  starts  with  the  disagreement  of  a  minority.
So,  let  us  encourage  the  expression  of  all  kinds  of  disagreements  –  with  two  exceptions: The  right  (1)  to  express  your  views  and  (2)  to  be  the  master  of  your  course  in  life should never  be  challenged.
Not,  at  least ,  in  a  free  society.

 

8. april 2013

4. JANUAR 2006: OPLYST AMERIKANER – UDSYNET OG OVERBLIKKET ER NÆSTEN HELT GÅET TABT HERHJEMME


Information of USA

 THE CENTURY AHEAD

 It’s the Demography, Stupid

 The real reason the West is in danger of extinction.

BY MARK STEYN

Most people reading this have strong stomachs, so let me lay it out as baldly as I can: Much of what we loosely call the Western world will not survive this century, and much of it will effectively disappear within our lifetimes, including many if not most Western European countries. There’ll probably still be a geographical area on the map marked as Italy or the Netherlands–probably–just as in Istanbul there’s still a building called St. Sophia’s Cathedral. But it’s not a cathedral; it’s merely a designation for a piece of real estate. Likewise, Italy and the Netherlands will merely be designations for real estate. The challenge for those who reckon Western civilization is on balance better than the alternatives is to figure out a way to save at least some parts of the West. One obstacle to doing that is that, in the typical election campaign in your advanced industrial democracy, the political platforms of at least one party in the United States and pretty much all parties in the rest of the West are largely about what one would call the secondary impulses of society–government health care, government day care (which Canada’s thinking of introducing), govern ment paternity leave (which Britain’s just introduced). We’ve prioritized the secondary impulse over the primary ones: national defense, family, faith and, most basic of all, reproductive activity–“Go forth and multiply,” because if you don’t you won’t be able to afford all those secondary-impulse issues, like cradle-to-grave welfare.

Americans sometimes don’t understand how far gone most of the rest of the developed world is down this path: In the Canadian and most Continental cabinets, the defense ministry is somewhere an ambitious politician passes through on his way up to important jobs like the health department. I don’t think Don Rumsfeld would regard it as a promotion if he were moved to Health and Human Services.

The design flaw of the secular social-democratic state is that it requires a religious-society birthrate to sustain it. Post-Christian hyperrationalism is, in the objective sense, a lot less rational than Catholicism or Mormonism. Indeed, in its reliance on immigration to ensure its future, the European Union has adopted a 21st-century variation on the strategy of the Shakers, who were forbidden from reproducing and thus could increase their numbers only by conversion. The problem is that secondary-impulse societies mistake their weaknesses for strengths–or, at any rate, virtues–and that’s why they’re proving so feeble at dealing with a primal force like Islam.

Speaking of which, if we are at war–and half the American people and significantly higher percentages in Britain, Canada and Europe don’t accept that proposition–then what exactly is the war about?

We know it’s not really a “war on terror.” Nor is it, at heart, a war against Islam, or even “radical Islam.” The Muslim faith, whatever its merits for the believers, is a problematic business for the rest of us.
There are many trouble spots around the world, but as a general rule, it’s easy to make an educated guess at one of the participants: Muslims vs. Jews in “Palestine,” Muslims vs. Hindus in Kashmir, Muslims vs. Christians in Africa, Muslims vs. Buddhists in Thailand, Muslims vs. Russians in the Caucasus, Muslims vs. backpacking tourists in Bali. Like the environmentalists, these guys think globally but act locally.

Yet while Islamism is the enemy, it’s not what this thing’s about. Radical Islam is an opportunistic infection, like AIDS: It’s not the HIV that kills you, it’s the pneumonia you get when your body’s too weak to fight it off. When the jihadists engage with the U.S. military, they lose–as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq. If this were like World War I with those fellows in one trench and us in ours facing them over some boggy piece of terrain, it would be over very quickly. Which the smarter Islamists have figured out.

They know they can never win on the battlefield, but they figure there’s an excellent chance they can drag things out until Western civilization collapses in on itself and Islam inherits by default.

That’s what the war’s about: our lack of civilizational confidence. As a famous Arnold Toynbee quote puts it: “Civilizations die from suicide, not murder”–as can be seen throughout much of “the Western world” right now.

The progressive agenda–lavish social welfare, abortion, secularism, multiculturalism–is collectively the real suicide bomb. Take multiculturalism. The great thing about multiculturalism is that it doesn’t involve knowing anything about other cultures–the capital of Bhutan, the principal exports of Malawi, who cares? All it requires is feeling good about other cultures. It’s fundamentally a fraud, and I would argue was subliminally accepted on that basis. Most adherents to the idea that all cultures are equal don’t want to live in anything but an advanced Western society. Multiculturalism means your kid has to learn some wretched native dirge for the school holiday concert instead of getting to sing “Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer” or that your holistic masseuse uses techniques developed from Native American spirituality, but not that you or anyone you care about should have to live in an African or Native American society.

It’s a quintessential piece of progressive humbug.Then September 11 happened. And bizarrely the reaction of just about every prominent Western leader was to visit a mosque: President Bush did, the prince of Wales did, the prime minister of the United Kingdom did, the prime minister of Canada did . . . The premier of Ontario didn’t, and so 20 Muslim community leaders had a big summit to denounce him for failing to visit a mosque. I don’t know why he didn’t. Maybe there was a big backlog, it was mosque drive time, prime ministers in gridlock up and down the freeway trying to get to the Sword of the Infidel-Slayer Mosque on Elm Street. But for whatever reason he couldn’t fit it into his hectic schedule. Ontario’s citizenship minister did show up at a mosque, but the imams took that as a great insult, like the Queen sending Fergie to open the Commonwealth Games. So the premier of Ontario had to hold a big meeting with the aggrieved imams to apologize for not going to a mosque and, as the Toronto Star’s reported it, “to provide them with reassurance that the provincial government does not see them as the enemy.”

Anyway, the get-me-to-the-mosque-on-time fever died down, but it set the tone for our general approach to these atrocities. The old definition of a nanosecond was the gap between the traffic light changing in New York and the first honk from a car behind. The new definition is the gap between a terrorist bombing and the press release from an Islamic lobby group warning of a backlash against Muslims. In most circumstances, it would be considered appallingly bad taste to deflect attention from an actual “hate crime” by scaremongering about a purely hypothetical one. Needless to say, there is no campaign of Islamophobic hate crimes. If anything, the West is awash in an epidemic of self-hate crimes. A commenter on Tim Blair’s Web site in Australia summed it up in a note-perfect parody of a Guardian headline: “Muslim Community Leaders Warn of Backlash from Tomorrow Morning’s Terrorist Attack.” Those community leaders have the measure of us.

Radical Islam is what multiculturalism has been waiting for all along. In “The Survival of Culture,” I quoted the eminent British barrister Helena Kennedy, Queen’s Counsel. Shortly after September 11, Baroness Kennedy argued on a BBC show that it was too easy to disparage “Islamic fundamentalists.” “We as Western liberals too often are fundamentalist ourselves,” she complained. “We don’t look at our own fundamentalisms.”

Well, said the interviewer, what exactly would those Western liberal fundamentalisms be? “One of the things that we are too ready to insist upon is that we are the tolerant people and that the intolerance is something that belongs to other countries like Islam. And I’m not sure that’s true.”

Hmm. Lady Kennedy was arguing that our tolerance of our own tolerance is making us intolerant of other people’s intolerance, which is intolerable. And, unlikely as it sounds, this has now become the highest, most rarefied form of multiculturalism. So you’re nice to gays and the Inuit? Big deal. Anyone can be tolerant of fellows like that, but tolerance of intolerance gives an even more intense frisson of pleasure to the multiculti masochists. In other words, just as the AIDS pandemic greatly facilitated societal surrender to the gay agenda, so 9/11 is greatly facilitating our surrender to the most extreme aspects of the multicultural agenda.

For example, one day in 2004, a couple of Canadians returned home, to Lester B. Pearson International Airport in Toronto. They were the son and widow of a fellow called Ahmed Said Khadr, who back on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier was known as “al-Kanadi.” Why? Because he was the highest-ranking Canadian in al Qaeda–plenty of other Canucks in al Qaeda, but he was the Numero Uno. In fact, one could argue that the Khadr family is Canada’s principal contribution to the war on terror. Granted they’re on the wrong side (if you’ll forgive my being judgmental) but no one can argue that they aren’t in the thick of things. One of Mr. Khadr’s sons was captured in Afghanistan after killing a U.S. Special Forces medic. Another was captured and held at Guantanamo. A third blew himself up while killing a Canadian soldier in Kabul. Pa Khadr himself died in an al Qaeda shootout with Pakistani forces in early 2004. And they say we Canadians aren’t doing our bit in this war!

In the course of the fatal shootout of al-Kanadi, his youngest son was paralyzed. And, not unreasonably, Junior didn’t fancy a prison hospital in Peshawar. So Mrs. Khadr and her boy returned to Toronto so he could enjoy the benefits of Ontario government health care. “I’m Canadian, and I’m not begging for my rights,” declared the widow Khadr. “I’m demanding my rights.”

As they always say, treason’s hard to prove in court, but given the circumstances of Mr. Khadr’s death it seems clear that not only was he providing “aid and comfort to the Queen’s enemies” but that he was, in fact, the Queen’s enemy. The Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, the Royal 22nd Regiment and other Canucks have been participating in Afghanistan, on one side of the conflict, and the Khadr family had been over there participating on the other side. Nonetheless, the prime minister of Canada thought Boy Khadr’s claims on the public health system was an excellent opportunity to demonstrate his own deep personal commitment to “diversity.” Asked about the Khadrs’ return to Toronto, he said, “I believe that once you are a Canadian citizen, you have the right to your own views and to disagree.”

That’s the wonderful thing about multiculturalism: You can choose which side of the war you want to fight on. When the draft card arrives, just tick “home team” or “enemy,” according to taste. The Canadian prime minister is a typical late-stage Western politician: He could have said, well, these are contemptible people and I know many of us are disgusted at the idea of our tax dollars being used to provide health care for a man whose Canadian citizenship is no more than a flag of convenience, but unfortunately that’s the law and, while we can try to tighten it, it looks like this lowlife’s got away with it. Instead, his reflex instinct was to proclaim this as a wholehearted demonstration of the virtues of the multicultural state. Like many enlightened Western leaders, the Canadian prime minister will be congratulating himself on his boundless tolerance even as the forces of intolerance consume him.

That, by the way, is the one point of similarity between the jihad and conventional terrorist movements like the IRA or ETA. Terror groups persist because of a lack of confidence on the part of their targets: The IRA, for example, calculated correctly that the British had the capability to smash them totally but not the will. So they knew that while they could never win militarily, they also could never be defeated. The Islamists have figured similarly. The only difference is that most terrorist wars are highly localized. We now have the first truly global terrorist insurgency because the Islamists view the whole world the way the IRA view the bogs of Fermanagh: They want it, and they’ve calculated that our entire civilization lacks the will to see them off.

We spend a lot of time at The New Criterion attacking the elites, and we’re right to do so. The commanding heights of the culture have behaved disgracefully for the last several decades. But if it were just a problem with the elites, it wouldn’t be that serious: The mob could rise up and hang ‘em from lampposts–a scenario that’s not unlikely in certain Continental countries. But the problem now goes way beyond the ruling establishment. The annexation by government of most of the key responsibilities of life–child-raising, taking care of your elderly parents–has profoundly changed the relationship between the citizen and the state. At some point–I would say socialized health care is a good marker–you cross a line, and it’s very hard then to persuade a citizenry enjoying that much government largesse to cross back. In National Review recently, I took issue with that line Gerald Ford always uses to ingratiate himself with conservative audiences: “A government big enough to give you everything you want is big enough to take away everything you have.” Actually, you run into trouble long before that point: A government big enough to give you everything you want still isn’t big enough to get you to give anything back. That’s what the French and German political classes are discovering.

Go back to that list of local conflicts I mentioned. The jihad has held out a long time against very tough enemies. If you’re not shy about taking on the Israelis, the Russians, the Indians and the Nigerians, why wouldn’t you fancy your chances against the Belgians and Danes and New Zealanders? So the jihadists are for the most part doing no more than giving us a prod in the rear as we sleepwalk to the cliff. When I say “sleepwalk,” it’s not because we’re a blasé culture. On the contrary, one of the clearest signs of our decline is the way we expend so much energy worrying about the wrong things. If you’ve read Jared Diamond’s bestselling book “Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed,” you’ll know it goes into a lot of detail about Easter Island going belly up because they chopped down all their trees. Apparently that’s why they’re not a G-8 member or on the U.N. Security Council. Same with the Greenlanders and the Mayans and Diamond’s other curious choices of “societies.” Indeed, as the author sees it, pretty much every society collapses because it chops down its trees.

Poor old Diamond can’t see the forest because of his obsession with the trees. (Russia’s collapsing even as it’s undergoing reforestation.) One way “societies choose to fail or succeed” is by choosing what to worry about. The Western world has delivered more wealth and more comfort to more of its citizens than any other civilization in history, and in return we’ve developed a great cult of worrying. You know the classics of the genre: In 1968, in his bestselling book “The Population Bomb,” the eminent scientist Paul Ehrlich declared: “In the 1970s the world will undergo famines–hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death.” In 1972, in their landmark study “The Limits to Growth,” the Club of Rome announced that the world would run out of gold by 1981, of mercury by 1985, tin by 1987, zinc by 1990, petroleum by 1992, and copper, lead and gas by 1993.

None of these things happened. In fact, quite the opposite is happening. We’re pretty much awash in resources, but we’re running out of people–the one truly indispensable resource, without which none of the others matter. Russia’s the most obvious example: it’s the largest country on earth, it’s full of natural resources, and yet it’s dying–its population is falling calamitously.The default mode of our elites is that anything that happens–from terrorism to tsunamis–can be understood only as deriving from the perniciousness of Western civilization. As Jean-Francois Revel wrote, “Clearly, a civilization that feels guilty for everything it is and does will lack the energy and conviction to defend itself.”

And even though none of the prognostications of the eco-doom blockbusters of the 1970s came to pass, all that means is that 30 years on, the end of the world has to be rescheduled. The amended estimated time of arrival is now 2032. That’s to say, in 2002, the United Nations Global Environmental Outlook predicted “the destruction of 70 percent of the natural world in thirty years, mass extinction of species. . . . More than half the world will be afflicted by water shortages, with 95 percent of people in the Middle East with severe problems . . . 25 percent of all species of mammals and 10 percent of birds will be extinct . . .”

Etc., etc., for 450 pages. Or to cut to the chase, as the Guardian headlined it, “Unless We Change Our Ways, The World Faces Disaster.”

Well, here’s my prediction for 2032: unless we change our ways the world faces a future . . . where the environment will look pretty darn good. If you’re a tree or a rock, you’ll be living in clover. It’s the Italians and the Swedes who’ll be facing extinction and the loss of their natural habitat.

There will be no environmental doomsday. Oil, carbon dioxide emissions, deforestation: none of these things is worth worrying about. What’s worrying is that we spend so much time worrying about things that aren’t worth worrying about that we don’t worry about the things we should be worrying about. For 30 years, we’ve had endless wake-up calls for things that aren’t worth waking up for. But for the very real, remorseless shifts in our society–the ones truly jeopardizing our future–we’re sound asleep.
The world is changing dramatically right now, and hysterical experts twitter about a hypothetical decrease in the Antarctic krill that might conceivably possibly happen so far down the road there are unlikely to be any Italian or Japanese enviro-worriers left alive to be devastated by it.

In a globalized economy, the environmentalists want us to worry about First World capitalism imposing its ways on bucolic, pastoral, primitive Third World backwaters. Yet, insofar as “globalization” is a threat, the real danger is precisely the opposite–that the peculiarities of the backwaters can leap instantly to the First World. Pigs are valued assets and sleep in the living room in rural China–and next thing you know an unknown respiratory disease is killing people in Toronto, just because someone got on a plane. That’s the way to look at Islamism: We fret about McDonald’s and Disney, but the big globalization success story is the way the Saudis have taken what was 80 years ago a severe but obscure and unimportant strain of Islam practiced by Bedouins of no fixed abode and successfully exported it to the heart of Copenhagen, Rotterdam, Manchester, Buffalo…

What’s the better bet? A globalization that exports cheeseburgers and pop songs or a globalization that exports the fiercest aspects of its culture? When it comes to forecasting the future, the birthrate is the nearest thing to hard numbers. If only a million babies are born in 2006, it’s hard to have two million adults enter the workforce in 2026 (or 2033, or 2037, or whenever they get around to finishing their Anger Management and Queer Studies degrees). And the hard data on babies around the Western world is that they’re running out a lot faster than the oil is. “Replacement” fertility rate–i.e., the number you need for merely a stable population, not getting any bigger, not getting any smaller–is 2.1 babies per woman. Some countries are well above that: the global fertility leader, Somalia, is 6.91, Niger 6.83, Afghanistan 6.78, Yemen 6.75. Notice what those nations have in common? Scroll way down to the bottom of the Hot One Hundred top breeders and you’ll eventually find the United States, hovering just at replacement rate with 2.07 births per woman. Ireland is 1.87, New Zealand 1.79, Australia 1.76. But Canada’s fertility rate is down to 1.5, well below replacement rate; Germany and Austria are at 1.3, the brink of the death spiral; Russia and Italy are at 1.2; Spain 1.1, about half replacement rate. That’s to say, Spain’s population is halving every generation. By 2050, Italy’s population will have fallen by 22%, Bulgaria’s by 36%, Estonia’s by 52%. In America, demographic trends suggest that the blue states ought to apply for honorary membership of the EU: In the 2004 election, John Kerry won the 16 with the lowest birthrates; George W. Bush took 25 of the 26 states with the highest. By 2050, there will be 100 million fewer Europeans, 100 million more Americans–and mostly red-state Americans.

As fertility shrivels, societies get older–and Japan and much of Europe are set to get older than any functioning societies have ever been. And we know what comes after old age. These countries are going out of business–unless they can find the will to change their ways. Is that likely? I don’t think so. If you look at European election results–most recently in Germany–it’s hard not to conclude that, while voters are unhappy with their political establishments, they’re unhappy mainly because they resent being asked to reconsider their government benefits and, no matter how unaffordable they may be a generation down the road, they have no intention of seriously reconsidering them. The Scottish executiverecently backed down from a proposal to raise the retirement age of Scottish public workers. It’s presently 60, which is nice but unaffordable. But the reaction of the average Scots worker is that that’s somebody else’s problem. The average German worker now puts in 22% fewer hours per year than his American counterpart, and no politician who wishes to remain electorally viable will propose closing the gap in any meaningful way.

This isn’t a deep-rooted cultural difference between the Old World and the New. It dates back all the way to, oh, the 1970s. If one wanted to allocate blame, one could argue that it’s a product of the U.S. military presence, the American security guarantee that liberated European budgets: instead of having to spend money on guns, they could concentrate on butter, and buttering up the voters. If Washington’s problem with Europe is that these are not serious allies, well, whose fault is that? Who, in the years after the Second World War, created NATO as a postmodern military alliance? The “free world,” as the Americans called it, was a free ride for everyone else. And having been absolved from the primal responsibilities of nationhood, it’s hardly surprising that European nations have little wish to reshoulder them. In essence, the lavish levels of public health care on the Continent are subsidized by the American taxpayer. And this long-term softening of large sections of the West makes them ill-suited to resisting a primal force like Islam.

There is no “population bomb.” There never was. Birthrates are declining all over the world–eventually every couple on the planet may decide to opt for the Western yuppie model of one designer baby at the age of 39. But demographics is a game of last man standing. The groups that succumb to demographic apathy last will have a huge advantage. Even in 1968 Paul Ehrlich and his ilk should have understood that their so-called population explosion was really a massive population adjustment. Of the increase in global population between 1970 and 2000, the developed world accounted for under 9% of it, while the Muslim world accounted for 26%. Between 1970 and 2000, the developed world declined from just under 30% of the world’s population to just over 20%, the Muslim nations increased from about 15% to 20%.

Nineteen seventy doesn’t seem that long ago. If you’re the age many of the chaps running the Western world today are wont to be, your pants are narrower than they were back then and your hair’s less groovy, but the landscape of your life–the look of your house, the layout of your car, the shape of your kitchen appliances, the brand names of the stuff in the fridge–isn’t significantly different. Aside from the Internet and the cell phone and the CD, everything in your world seems pretty much the same but slightly modified.

And yet the world is utterly altered. Just to recap those bald statistics: In 1970, the developed world had twice as big a share of the global population as the Muslim world: 30% to 15%. By 2000, they were the same: each had about 20%.

And by 2020?

So the world’s people are a lot more Islamic than they were back then and a lot less “Western.” Europe is significantly more Islamic, having taken in during that period some 20 million Muslims (officially)–or the equivalents of the populations of four European Union countries (Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and Estonia). Islam is the fastest-growing religion in the West: In the U.K., more Muslims than Christians attend religious services each week.

Can these trends continue for another 30 years without having consequences? Europe by the end of this century will be a continent after the neutron bomb: The grand buildings will still be standing, but the people who built them will be gone. We are living through a remarkable period: the self-extinction of the races who, for good or ill, shaped the modern world.

What will Europe be like at the end of this process? Who knows? On the one hand, there’s something to be said for the notion that America will find an Islamified Europe more straightforward to deal with than M. Chirac, Herr Schroeder & Co. On the other hand, given Europe’s track record, getting there could be very bloody. But either way this is the real battlefield. The al Qaeda nutters can never find enough suicidal pilots to fly enough planes into enough skyscrapers to topple America. But unlike us, the Islamists think long-term, and, given their demographic advantage in Europe and the tone of the emerging Muslim lobby groups there, much of what they’re flying planes into buildings for they’re likely to wind up with just by waiting a few more years. The skyscrapers will be theirs; why knock ‘em over?
The latter half of the decline and fall of great civilizations follows a familiar pattern: affluence, softness, decadence, extinction. You don’t notice yourself slipping through those stages because usually there’s a seductive pol on hand to provide the age with a sly, self-deluding slogan–like Bill Clinton’s “It’s about the future of all our children.” We on the right spent the 1990s gleefully mocking Mr. Clinton’s tedious invocation, drizzled like syrup over everything from the Kosovo war to highway appropriations. But most of the rest of the West can’t even steal his lame bromides: A society that has no children has no future.

Permanence is the illusion of every age. In 1913, no one thought the Russian, Austrian, German and Turkish empires would be gone within half a decade. Seventy years on, all those fellows who dismissed Reagan as an “amiable dunce” (in Clark Clifford’s phrase) assured us the Soviet Union was likewise here to stay. The CIA analysts’ position was that East Germany was the ninth biggest economic power in the world. In 1987 there was no rash of experts predicting the imminent fall of the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Pact and the USSR itself.

Yet, even by the minimal standards of these wretched precedents, so-called post-Christian civilizations–as a prominent EU official described his continent to me–are more prone than traditional societies to mistake the present tense for a permanent feature. Religious cultures have a much greater sense of both past and future, as we did a century ago, when we spoke of death as joining “the great majority” in “the unseen world.” But if secularism’s starting point is that this is all there is, it’s no surprise that, consciously or not, they invest the here and now with far greater powers of endurance than it’s ever had. The idea that progressive Euro-welfarism is the permanent resting place of human development was always foolish; we now know that it’s suicidally so.

To avoid collapse, European nations will need to take in immigrants at a rate no stable society has ever attempted. The CIA is predicting the EU will collapse by 2020. Given that the CIA’s got pretty much everything wrong for half a century, that would suggest the EU is a shoo-in to be the colossus of the new millennium. But even a flop spook is right twice a generation. If anything, the date of EU collapse is rather a cautious estimate. It seems more likely that within the next couple of European election cycles, the internal contradictions of the EU will manifest themselves in the usual way, and that by 2010 we’ll be watching burning buildings, street riots and assassinations on American network news every night. Even if they avoid that, the idea of a childless Europe ever rivaling America militarily or economically is laughable. Sometime this century there will be 500 million Americans, and what’s left in Europe will either be very old or very Muslim. Japan faces the same problem: Its
population is already in absolute decline, the first gentle slope of a death spiral it will be unlikely ever to climb out of. Will Japan be an economic powerhouse if it’s populated by Koreans and Filipinos? Very possibly. Will Germany if it’s populated by Algerians? That’s a trickier proposition.

Best-case scenario? The Continent winds up as Vienna with Swedish tax rates.

Worst-case scenario: Sharia, circa 2040; semi-Sharia, a lot sooner–and we’re already seeing a drift in that direction.

In July 2003, speaking to the U.S. Congress, Tony Blair remarked: “As Britain knows, all predominant power seems for a time invincible but, in fact, it is transient. The question is: What do you leave behind?”

Excellent question. Britannia will never again wield the unrivalled power she enjoyed at her imperial apogee, but the Britannic inheritance endures, to one degree or another, in many of the key regional players in the world today–Australia, India, South Africa–and in dozens of island statelets from the Caribbean to the Pacific. If China ever takes its place as an advanced nation, it will be because the People’s Republic learns more from British Hong Kong than Hong Kong learns from the Little Red Book. And of course the dominant power of our time derives its political character from 18th-century British subjects who took English ideas a little further than
the mother country was willing to go.

A decade and a half after victory in the Cold War and end-of-history triumphalism, the “what do you leave behind?” question is more urgent than most of us expected. “The West,” as a concept, is dead, and the West, as a matter of demographic fact, is dying.

What will London–or Paris, or Amsterdam–be like in the mid-’30s? If European politicians make no serious attempt this decade to wean the populace off their unsustainable 35-hour weeks, retirement at 60, etc., then to keep the present level of pensions and health benefits the EU will need to import so many workers from North Africa and the Middle East that it will be well on its way to majority Muslim by 2035. As things stand, Muslims are already the primary source of population growth in English cities. Can a society become increasingly Islamic in its demographic character without becoming increasingly Islamic in its political character?

This ought to be the left’s issue. I’m a conservative–I’m not entirely on board with the Islamist program when it comes to beheading sodomites and so on, but I agree Britney Spears dresses like a slut: I’m with Mullah Omar on that one. Why then, if your big thing is feminism or abortion or gay marriage, are you so certain that the cult of tolerance will prevail once the biggest demographic in your society is cheerfully intolerant? Who, after all, are going to be the first victims of the West’s collapsed birthrates? Even if one were to take the optimistic view that Europe will be able to resist the creeping imposition of Sharia currently engulfing Nigeria, it remains the case that the Muslim world is not notable for setting much store by “a woman’s right to choose,” in any sense.
I watched that big abortion rally in Washington in 2004, where Ashley Judd and Gloria Steinem were cheered by women waving “Keep your Bush off my bush” placards, and I thought it was the equivalent of a White Russian tea party in 1917. By prioritizing a “woman’s right to choose,” Western women are delivering their societies into the hands of fellows far more patriarchal than a 1950s sitcom dad. If any of those women marching for their “reproductive rights” still have babies, they might like to ponder demographic realities: A little girl born today will be unlikely, at the age of 40, to be free to prance around demonstrations in Eurabian Paris or Amsterdam chanting “Hands off my bush!”

Just before the 2004 election, that eminent political analyst Cameron Diaz appeared on the Oprah Winfrey show to explain what was at stake:

“Women have so much to lose. I mean, we could lose the right to our bodies. . . . If you think that rape should be legal, then don’t vote. But if you think that you have a right to your body,” she advised Oprah’s viewers, “then you should vote.”

Poor Cameron. A couple of weeks later, the scary people won. She lost all rights to her body. Unlike Alec Baldwin, she couldn’t even move to France. Her body was grounded in Terminal D.

But, after framing the 2004 presidential election as a referendum on the right to rape, Miss Diaz might be interested to know that men enjoy that right under many Islamic legal codes around the world. In his book “The Empty Cradle,” Philip Longman asks: “So where will the children of the future come from? Increasingly they will come from people who are at odds with the modern world. Such a trend, if sustained, could drive human culture off its current market-driven, individualistic, modernist course, gradually creating an anti-market culture dominated by fundamentalism–a new Dark Ages.”

Bottom line for Cameron Diaz: There are worse things than John Ashcroft out there.

Mr. Longman’s point is well taken. The refined antennae of Western liberals mean that whenever one raises the question of whether there will be any Italians living in the geographical zone marked as Italy a generation or three hence, they cry, “Racism!” To fret about what proportion of the population is “white” is grotesque and inappropriate. But it’s not about race, it’s about culture. If 100% of your population believes in liberal pluralist democracy, it doesn’t matter whether 70% of them are “white” or only 5% are. But if one part of your population believes in liberal pluralist democracy and the other doesn’t, then it becomes a matter of great importance whether the part that does is 90% of the population or only 60%, 50%, 45%.

Since the president unveiled the so-called Bush Doctrine–the plan to promote liberty throughout the Arab world–innumerable “progressives” have routinely asserted that there’s no evidence Muslims want liberty and, indeed, that Islam is incompatible with democracy. If that’s true, it’s a problem not for the Middle East today but for Europe the day after tomorrow. According to a poll taken in 2004, over 60% of British Muslims want to live under Shariah–in the United Kingdom. If a population “at odds with the modern world” is the fastest-breeding group on the planet–if there are more Muslim nations, more fundamentalist Muslims within those nations, more and more Muslims within non-Muslim nations, and more and more Muslims represented in more and more transnational institutions–how safe a bet is the survival of the “modern world”?

Not good.

“What do you leave behind?” asked Tony Blair. There will only be very few and very old ethnic Germans and French and Italians by the midpoint of this century. What will they leave behind? Territories that happen to bear their names and keep up some of the old buildings? Or will the dying European races understand that the only legacy that matters is whether the peoples who will live in those lands after them are reconciled to pluralist, liberal democracy? It’s the demography, stupid. And, if they can’t muster the will to change course, then “What do you leave behind?” is the only question that matters.

Mr. Steyn is a syndicated columnist and theater critic for The New Criterion, in whose January issue this article appears.

6443841

After America, bestseller

Steyn’s 2011 must-read was a Top Five Washington Post bestseller, a Top Four New York Times bestseller, a Top Four Amazon bestseller, a Top Three Globe & Mail bestseller in Canada, and a Number One bestseller at Amazon Canada. And now it’s out in paperback, with a brand new introduction and more timely than ever in the wake of the US elections.

Stikord herfra

6. april 2013

10 år gammel nyhed: 29 ukendte sygdomme siden 1973


Information om Danmark

Invandrare sprider tuberkulos

29 tidigare okända sjukdomar har upptäckts sedan 1973 och ett tjugotal gamla sjukdomar har återvänt med ny styrka.

TBC var nästan utrotad, men efter 1988 har antalet fall stigit katastrofalt i Norden bland unga negrer. Nya multiresistenta varianter, som ingen medicin biter på skapas oupphörligt. De nya virustyperna angriper i synnerhet våra åldringar.

Svensk TV rapporterade 9. juni 2002 att ett större antal TBC-fall med ett multiresistent virus hade drabbat Stockholm, och gett upphov till ett dödsfall (se sidstnævnte link neden for). Det varnades för att det fanns risk för utbrott av en TBC-epidemi.

Supplement og dokumentation:
http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/sexsyg.html

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/syga.html

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/vir.html

28. maj 1999, for knap 14 år siden kendte vi indstillingen til Vesten


Eksempler på modtaget materiale om indvandringsforholdene

Vestlige muslimske lederes udtalelser om Vesten og tysk holdningsundersøgelse

Visdomsord af muslimer og facts er samlet af en dansksindet, midtjysk, islam-ekspert:

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/udta.html

Politikernes reaktion herpå: De speedede hastigheden op, hvormed de fik dem til landet sammen med EU.

3. april 2013

RAUS AUS DEM EURO, REIN IN DEN KNAST


Quelle: http://info.kopp-verlag.de/hintergruende/deutschland/christine-ruetlisberger/kluge-koepfe-als-staatsfeinde-wie-politik-und-medien-euro-kritiker-bekaempfen.html

“…Die Intelligenz war gegen den Euro, die Dummheit dafür. Und dann kam es Schlag auf Schlag.

931400

Die Schwarzseher und Euro-Pessimisten von gestern sind die Realisten von heute. Das ist die wichtigste Erkenntnis dieses brandneuen Buches Raus aus dem Euro – Rein in den Knast von Udo Ulfkotte. Die Euro-Kritiker hatten den Mut, gegen den Zwangsumtausch von D-Mark und Schilling in die Einheitswährung aufzustehen, wo Politiker stur sitzen blieben. Und sie haben gesprochen, wo Politiker schwiegen. Sie haben »Nein« gesagt, wo Politiker »Ja« sagten. Sie haben innegehalten, wo Politiker mitliefen. Ungeachtet eventueller schmerzhafter Folgen haben sie Courage gezeigt und tapfer gegen die politische Korrektheit gekämpft…”

I al beskedenhed: Vi forudså udviklingen med euro, fordi vi vidste hvad vi skrev om euro, før den indførtes:

[In aller Bescheidenheit: Wir sahen die Entwicklung des Euro, weil wir wussten, was wir über den Euro schrieb vor der Einführung:]

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/eurom.html (English)

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/euromm.htm (English)

http://www.lilliput-information.com/economics/euro.html (dansk)

Der mange andre meget vægtige advarsler: 12. februar 1998 meldte 154 økonomiprofessorer i Tyskland helt på linie med Information om Danmarks oplysninger fra 1996, at Euro-projektet som det agtes gennemført er aldeles udsigtsløst. Yderligere kapitalflugt, høj rente, mere arbejdsløshed og hyper-inflation er resultaterne.

[Es gab viele andere sehr ernste Warnungen: 12 Februar 1998 berichteten 154 Wirtschaftsprofessoren in Deutschland völlig im Einklang mit Informationen über Dänemark 1996. Der Euro-Projekt, wie es beabsichtigt ist, umgesetzt werden völlig sinnlos. Weitere Kapitalflucht, hohe Zinsen, mehr Arbeitslosigkeit und Hyperinflation sind die Ergebnisse]

2. april 2013

München 30.03.2013: PROTEST MOD STORMOSKÉ – PLANER I MÜNCHEN


Protest gegen den Bau des ZIEM

Australien, das selbe

SVERIGES MIGRATIONSVERKET OG KORRUPTION – OM OMFANGET SVARER TIL DEN NEDDYSSEDE KORRUPTION I DANMARK UNDER BOSNIEN-KRIGEN VIDES IKKE


The Local:

“En anklagende advokat er af den opfattelse af Migrationsverkets ansatte sandsynligvis vil vise sig at være involveret i en længere række bestikkelsessager efter to ansatte blev arresteret for mistanke om at salg af opholdstilladelse.

Two arrested for selling residence permits (29 Jan 13)
An employee from the Malmö branch of the agency remains held on remand on suspicion of aggravated bribery. And another employee who was recently released from custody remains suspected of bribery.  A previous manager, who currently works in another state department in southern Sweden, is also suspected of involvement in the scam…”

——
Om den nye års-antals-rekord i 2012 med 110.000 fortrinsvis fra lav-IQ-områder skyldes akkordarbejde i Migrationsverket eller måske snarere korruption kan vi ikke vide.

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